As America continues
to contemplate its trade mess, the question naturally arises how other
developed nations manage to trade with the world without deficits and without
turning high-wage industries into low-wage industries to compete. Although some
other developed nations, like Britain and Spain, have trade situations almost
as bad as ours in recent years, some have been quite the opposite.
Germany is perhaps
the best case in point, as this Montana-sized country of 82 million people was
the world�s #1 exporter until 2008, surpassing the United States even today and
only surpassed by China in 2009. Germany is more culturally familiar to Americans
than Japan, another strong performer in the developed world, and thus its
policies are easier to understand. (Both nations, by the way, now pay their
workers industrial wages higher than the U.S.) This is all without significant
natural resources to export (Canada doesn�t count) and while supporting a
welfare state generous by American standards. And the rest of Germanic and
Scandinavian Europe follows, broadly speaking, similar economic policies, so it
is well-worth understanding how the Germans do it.
Germany, like the
U.S., is nominally a free-trading country. The difference is that while the
U.S. genuinely believes in free
trade, Germany quietly follows a contrary tradition that goes back to the
19th-century German economist Friedrich List (who was, ironically, a student of
our own Alexander Hamilton, the man on the $10 bill). So despite Germany�s
nominal policy of free trade, in reality, a huge key to its trading success is
a vast and half-hidden thicket of de
facto non-tariff trade barriers. That these barriers exist is not
especially controversial, even among those who espouse free trade and thus deny
that they serve any useful purpose. For example, according to a report by the
conservative Heritage Foundation:
Non-tariff
barriers reflected in EU and German policy include agricultural and
manufacturing subsidies, quotas, import restrictions and bans for some goods
and services, market access restrictions in some services sectors,
non-transparent and restrictive regulations and standards, and inconsistent
regulatory and customs administration among EU members. Restrictions in
services markets and the burden of regulations and standards exceed EU policy.
Germany�s covert
trade barriers -- which should perhaps better be called �trade balancing measures,�
as it would be a mistake to confuse them with crude protectionism -- begin with
careful control over Germany�s currency. As Americans presumably realize by now
thanks to our problems with China, overt or covert currency manipulation can do
a lot to improve a nation�s trade performance at the expense of its trading
partners. When Germany was still on the Deutschmark, for example, it did not
allow mass asset sales and foreign borrowing, preventing its currency from
being manipulated, and thus it was protected against trade deficits. Germany�s
adoption of the euro constituted a de
facto downwards manipulation of its own currency, because the euro is
essentially a one-size-fits-all �blend� currency, too strong for the weaker
economies of Europe, but too weak for the stronger ones. The net effect is to
encourage a trade surplus by the strong countries and the gradual selling-off
and indebtedness of the weaker ones. Because two-thirds of Germany�s trade is
with the rest of Europe, euro-related policies have a huge effect on German
trade.
Another key policy:
Germany does not use the credit system to subsidize short-term consumption as
the U.S. does. For example, Germany has remarkably few credit cards per person.
This tends to direct lendable money into investment, not consumption. This
tends to favor balanced trade because investment strengthens industrial
competitiveness, while consuming more than one produces necessarily means
sourcing from abroad (as there�s nowhere else to get goods if you didn�t produce them yourself). Different tax
policies also have a big effect. Above all, Germany has a 19 percent
value-added tax (VAT) and the US doesn�t. So American goods entering Germany
pay a border-adjustment tax, but German goods entering America don�t, a fact perfectly
legal under WTO rules.
The corporate
structure of Germany also fights trade deficits. Germany�s universal banks, for
example, pressure the companies they own stakes in not to source
components from abroad, which would weaken supplier companies they have big
loans to. Similar pressures operate in retail and other parts of the supply
chain. And the generally high level of German state involvement in
industry, ranging from training schemes to state-owned banks, comes with
similar strings attached. As one German puts it,
Germany
as a whole has a near 48% share of its economy is some shape or fashion state
controlled or run. The German is not even really fully aware of the true tax
load he�s under nor the proportion of government that controls his life. Tell
most Germans that the FRAPORT [airports] is a state entity and they are
perplexed and confused. Explain to them about the GEZ, and how ARD, ZDF, HR3,
SWF, DW, BR3, NDR, WDR etc. are more or less �state� run entities and they are
in disbelief. But the truth is, these agencies get their money through a tax
that the state controls and their CEO is state-appointed by a committee. The
Deutsche Bahn [national railway system] is another state entity, as is the
Telecom.
The excruciatingly
high technical and quality standards of many German (and now European) goods,
ranging from the need for cars to do 150 MPH to survive the autobahn to the
fact that American appliances (other than a few elite brands like the top
Whirlpool, Jenn-Air, and Subzero models) are regarded as 1970s junk to European
consumers, serve as barriers to penetration of European markets from the low
end. This low end is, of course, the thin end of the wedge, as Americans
learned from watching first Japanese and then Chinese imports to this country. Some
of these standards are based on actual laws; others are deep set cultural
preferences and thus consumer-driven.
It also doesn�t hurt
that the German economy is, thanks to decades of policy, biased towards
specializing in highly-exportable manufactured goods, while the U.S. excels in
services -- which may be nice to consume on a Sunday when the shops are closed
in Berlin, but are hard to export and thus don�t help our trade balance.
Although Germany is
nominally compliant with WTO rules, in reality, all manner of legal red tape is
employed to discourage imports. As one web commentator puts it:
The
reason why France had Citroen Peugeot and Renault for all these years and even
BMW and Mercedes, Fiat, Lancia etc. or Audi and VW could not break into their
market is because even Germany, Great Britain and Italy were being kept out of
the French market with such games for years. Now they �harmonized� a lot of
hidden trade barriers and while they no longer play the games they once did
with each other, they still play them with the U.S.
Import duty was (probably even more now from outside the EU) 10 % based on the
purchase price + freight costs to the place of destination in Germany + freight
insurance. Then comes the Mehrwertsteuer [value-added
tax or VAT], and you have to get a German VIN [vehicle identification number]
because of course the U.S. VIN in no good, and even if it�s a brand new car you
have to take it to the TUV [German equivalent of Underwriters Laboratories] and
the Kraftfahrtbundesamt [Federal
Motor Transport Authority] has to first
say that it�s even allowed to register the car in Germany.
German motor vehicle standards require many modifications to the US car despite
the fact that German safety standards (No side impact struts in doors, safety
glass that isn�t as good. . . . .etc.) are lower.
Example: On U.S. cars you had to disconnect the red brake light in the window
of cars many years ago. Years ago (The U.S. used halogen lights first) you had
to switch out headlights because the US used halogens on some cars and the
Germans didn�t. Why? What safety aspect was impacted? None! It was pure games
just to make it hard to import a car.
In sum, as another
web commentator explains, �free trade� to a German means:
We
should be able to sell all the cars in the US, but please don�t bring your Ami
hormone beef Dreckschleuder
[environmental hazard] car and silly Mickey Mouse phones to Germany! We have
the Telecom and they build perfectly good phones that come in 4 colors (until
the early 90s), and our cars without Kat
[catalytic converter] are so much cleaner and safer without airbags, without
side impact struts that are mandatory in the US and not in Germany (even
today), without better safety glass . . .
In fact, we Germans, with our big foreheads, have determined that despite our
BSE [mad cow disease], chicken flu, and the occasional farmer who feeds his
cows illegal steroids and antibiotics anyway, these are much safer than U.S.
beef that is hormone treated with (regulated) hormones and controlled by the
USDA. Also don�t bring your bad tasting US wine to our country! Yes, you use
(hybrid) plants and we don�t -- and therefore your wine is much worse than our
antifreeze wine from Italy and France and should be banned, after all -- how
dare you do something so uncultured
as using hybrid vines?
Ian Fletcher is the author of the Free
Trade Doesn�t Work: What Should Replace It and Why (USBIC, $24.95) An Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S.
Business and Industry Council, a Washington think tank founded in 1933;
he was previously an economist in private practice, mostly serving hedge funds
and private equity firms. He may be contacted at ian.fletcher@usbic.net.