Despite the bloody mess they�ve made in Iraq, the
neoconservatives are often let off the hook because it is said their intentions
were good. John Tierney of the New York Times called the Iraq adventure
�na�ve.� His colleague, Tom Friedman, has termed it �noble.� Rich Lowry, in the
National Review, defined �neo-realism� as �conservatives who take the best of
the neocons (basically the idealism) and the realists (the prudence) . . .�
Perhaps the most influential apologist is Francis Fukuyama
of Johns Hopkins University. Last October, the former neoconservative now
critical of the neocons, wrote in a New York Times Magazine article (�After
Neoconservatism�): �The problem with neoconservatism�s agenda lies not in its
ends, which are as American as apple pie, but rather in the over- militarized
means by which it sought to accomplish them.� Fukuyama repeatedly refers to the
neocons� �idealistic efforts� and their �na�ve Wilsonianism.�
The neocons are now often referred to in the past tense.
This may be a bit premature, given their calls to grace Iran with their bombs
of benevolence. In any case, before the last shovel of dirt is thrown on the
neocon casket, the obituary ought to include a questioning of their idealism,
starting with Fukuyama�s �na�ve Wilsonianism.�
Fukuyama is far too generous. Woodrow Wilson sought to
establish a multilateral organization, the League of Nations, in order to
prevent wars and promote democracy; the neocons show disdain for a multilateral
organization, the United Nations, and unilaterally start wars to impose
democracy at gunpoint. Both projects may be na�ve, but only one is Wilsonian.
Fukuyama and I have different views of idealism. When I
think of idealism, I think of the young. I think of Peace Corps Volunteers who
learn a language and live in hardship to help others, or early members of
Students for a Democratic Society who called for participatory democracy. I
think of college students going door-to-door to advance a candidate or a cause.
I don�t see in the same idealistic light middle-age men who start unjust wars.
True, I don�t know any neocons. I�ll never meet Dick Cheney,
Bill Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz or Richard Perle, so I can�t really know what
motivates them. But I know what I see and know what I read. What I see is an
easy, comfortable idealism -- the kind arrived at over dinner and dessert; the
kind mulled over brandy and cigars; the kind without risk; the kind others
fight and die for while the idealists pore over their maps of the Middle East.
What I read are papers and letters issued from the
neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) that emphasize
military buildup and the policing of the world. The ideal of promoting
democracy always seems tagged on.
In its Statement of Principals, the PNAC advocates an
increase in defense spending, the modernization of the armed forces, and the
promotion of the cause of political and economic freedom. The authors stress
that �American leadership is good both for America and for the world.� It
requires �military strength, diplomatic energy, and commitment to moral
principal.�
In a 1998 letter to President Clinton, the neocons urged a
�strategy for removing Saddam�s regime from power� with the aim of establishing
democracy in Iraq. When Clinton rejected their plan, they wrote a similar
letter to Newt Gingrich, speaker of the House, and Trent Lott, Senate majority
leader, asking them to pressure the president to seek their goal: �remove
Saddam and establish a peaceful and democratic Iraq.� (Both letters, along with
other PNAC papers, are signed by 17 neoconservatives, many who moved on to the
Bush administration, including Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Zalmay Khalizad,
Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.)
On September 24, 1999, the PNAC issued a response to George
W. Bush�s speech at the Citadel, citing what they considered strengths of the
speech, among them �the victory of American ideals.�
So the neocons do fly the flag of idealism, but always below
the banner of their first love: military buildup and war. Of course, one could
argue that invasion and occupation have to come first in the discussion because
that is the means by which the ideal -- democracy -- is to be achieved. If one
accepts the flawed premise that democracy can take root in an imperial bomb
crater, the argument is not without a veneer of logic. But there�s another PNAC
document that doesn�t even attempt to paper over the militarism.
A 90-page report of September 2000, entitled �Rebuilding
America�s Defenses,� argues for permanent bases in southeast Europe and
southeast Asia. It states that the U.S. must have the capability to �fight and
decisively win multiple, simultaneous major-theater wars. It contends that the
U.S. should �control the �new international commons� of space and cyberspace,
and pave the way for the creation of a new military service -- the U.S. Space
Force -- with the mission of space control.�
The report also argues that the U.S. military should play a
�constabulary� role in the world. All of these recommendations bristle with
militaristic, anti-democratic fantasy, but it�s this �constabulary� business
that best illustrates the neocons� true colors. In America, the local constable,
or sheriff, usually gets the job democratically -- by running for election. If
a group of local citizens proposed seizing the badge by force, they�d be
laughed out of town or arrested and thrown in the loony bin. Yet the neocons,
supposed champions of democracy, propose that very thing for the entire planet,
and are taken seriously by many.
The personal views of certain neoconservatives also suggest
an emphasis on imperialism over idealism. Paul Wolfowitz, the former World Bank
president and chief architect of the Iraq war, in a July 2003 interview for
Vanity Fair, said, �The decision to highlight weapons of mass destruction as
the main justification for going to war in Iraq was taken for bureaucratic
reasons.� Also that summer, at a meeting in Singapore, Wolfowitz was asked why
North Korea was being approached differently than Iraq. He replied, �Let�s look
at it simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is
that economically, we had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil.�
To grant the neoconservatives a na�ve idealism is to grant
them an innocence unearned, given the lies for war, the blood spilled, and the
damage to national security inflicted by their unilateralism. Any shred of
naivete we might lend them stems not from a lack of guile, but from ignorance.
This is the great paradox of the neoconservatives: their movement is a bizarre
blend of intellectual arrogance and stupefying ignorance. If one individual
could personify neoconservatism, he would be a combination of Friedrich
Nietzsche and Forrest Gump.
In all their papers, in all their letters to presidents and
members of Congress, one finds no understanding or appreciation of the
historical, cultural, ethnic or religious complexities that make up Iraq. If
any of them ever read Barbara Tuchman�s �The March of Folly,� they learned
nothing from it. As Max Cleland put it, �The people who got us into this war
didn�t want to learn from history.�
From the very beginning the neocons were not so much
idealistic as they were prisoners of their own ideology. They have yet to free
themselves. As late as 2005 -- long after the cakewalk had become a death march
-- in a paper, entitled �Iraq: Setting the Record Straight,� the neocons
exhibit a willful ignorance. After a section arguing that the search for WMD
might still bear fruit, the paper states: �Whatever the results of that search,
it will continue to be the case that the war was worth fighting, and that it
was necessary.�
In
the report�s concluding section, there is a sentence whose tragic irony is so
stark that it leaps off the page and slaps a sane person in the face: �The
prospects for war in the region have been substantially diminished by our
action.�