Hailed by President Bush as an act of �justice,� former
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was executed on the morning of December 30.
Hussein�s trial, Bush averred, had been a �fair� one. Yet
there was little that could be regarded as fair and legal about the
proceedings. The court itself was established at the Bush administration�s
behest. U.S. dollars financed the proceedings, and U.S. officials provided aid,
training and direct involvement. The trial was fraught with problems. Three of
Hussein�s lawyers were murdered and many defense witnesses were intimidated
into silence. The trial was a U.S.-directed effort, intended to paint the
occupation of Iraq in the best light.
The U.S. and British invasion had, we are reminded by
Western officials, overthrown this particular tyrant. But tyrants, like war
criminals, are in the eye of the beholder, and actions that might win praise
and support for one man might be condemned for another. Saddam Hussein found
himself on both sides of that equation at one time or another.
How does it happen that a man can be regarded as a friend
and ally one day, and an enemy the next? How is it that as praise fades away,
that same man comes to deserve capture and death? Is it because his behavior
has changed, or because there has been a transformation in perception?
At one time, Saddam Hussein was backed and promoted by the
U.S. His brutal methods were regarded as effective measures in furthering U.S.
objectives. But as his actions began to threaten U.S. interests, he earned
opprobrium.
In his early years, Saddam Hussein was on the CIA payroll.
Contacts began in 1959, when the agency sponsored him as a member of a small team
assigned to assassinate Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim. The prime
minister had made himself a target by committing the unpardonable sin of taking
his nation out of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact.
Hussein was set up in an apartment across the street from
Qasim�s office and told to observe his movements. But CIA plans received a
setback when the attempted assassination on October 7, 1959, was conducted in
so inept a manner that it failed to achieve its objective. An over-anxious
Hussein fired too soon, killing Qasim�s driver and only wounding the prime
minster.
Following the botched attempt on the prime minister�s life,
CIA and Egyptian intelligence agents helped Hussein to escape to Tikrit. From
there he crossed into Syria and then to Beirut, where the CIA provided him with
an apartment and put him through a short training course. Even at that young
age, a former U.S. intelligence official recalls, Hussein �was known as having
no class. He was a thug -- a cutthroat.� But he did have excellent anticommunist
credentials. From Beirut he was eventually sent to Cairo, where he remained
under the watchful eye of his CIA handlers and made frequent visits to the U.S.
embassy to meet with agency officials.
U.S. hostility towards Qasim had not abated, and he was
eventually killed in a Ba�ath Party coup in 1963, after which the CIA gave the
Iraqi National Guard lists of communists they wanted to see imprisoned and
executed. According to former U.S. intelligence officials, many suspected
communists were killed under the personal supervision of Hussein. As one former
U.S. State Department official put it, �We were frankly glad to be rid of them.
You ask that they get a fair trial? You have got to be kidding. This was
serious business.�
With his image burnished through such accomplishments,
Hussein first went on to become head of Iraqi security and then in 1979,
president of the nation. He remained allied with the U.S. during his first
decade in power as he ordered the arrest of communists and other political
opponents by the thousands. Nearly all would be tortured or killed. [1]
In 1980, Saddam Hussein
sent Iraqi troops to invade Iran in an attempt to seize territory by force of
arms. The resulting war dragged on for eight years, causing immense destruction
and costing the lives of 1.7 million people in one of the twentieth century�s
worst wars.
Relatively early in that war, in December 1983, President Reagan sent envoy Donald Rumsfeld to
Baghdad to meet Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and offer American assistance.
Rumsfeld told Hussein that the U.S. wanted full relations and �would regard any
major reversal of Iraq�s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West.� Just one
month before, State Department official Jonathan Howe had informed Secretary of
State George Schultz that Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iranian
forces on an �almost daily basis.� It was also well known by then that the
Hussein government was engaging in widespread repression. Many thousands of
individuals were being imprisoned, tortured, executed or sent into exile.
Howard Teicher worked for
the National Security Agency when he accompanied Rumsfeld on that mission.
Teicher recalls, �President Reagan decided that the United States would do
whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with
Iran,� and formalized a policy of assisting Iraq in a National Security
Decision Directive [NSDD] which Teicher helped draft. CIA Director William
Casey �personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military
weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war. Pursuant to
the secret NSDD, the United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by
supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S.
military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third
country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry
required.�
CIA personnel visited
Iraq on a regular basis to provide surveillance intelligence gathered by
U.S.-supplied Saudi AWACS planes in support of the Iraqi war effort. Both the
CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency directly assisted an Iraqi offensive in
February 1988 by electronically �blinding� Iranian radar for three days.
�The United States also
provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets
in combat,� Teicher said. �For example, in 1986, President Reagan sent a secret
message� through Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek, acting as an intermediary,
�to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing
of Iran,� and �similar strategic operational military advice was passed� to
Hussein through meetings with various heads of state.
Teicher �personally
attended meetings in which CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Robert Gates
�noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and
anti-armor penetrators in order to stave off Iranian attacks.� The CIA supplied
cluster bombs to Iraq through Cardoen, a Chilean company.
More than 60 officials of
the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency were involved in the program that not only
provided Iraq with intelligence on Iranian positions, but actually helped Iraq
to develop tactical battle plans as well as plans for air strikes. Although it
was well known by the later stages of the war that Iraqi forces were routinely
using chemical weapons against the Iranians, American support for Iraqi
offensives continued. �The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not
a matter of deep strategic concern,� recalled a former high-ranking Defense
Intelligence Agency official. U.S. leaders were more interested in ensuring the
defeat of Iran. The Pentagon �wasn�t so horrified by Iraq�s use of gas,�
remembered a former official involved in the program. �It was just another way
of killing people -- whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn�t make any
difference.�
Saddam Hussein received unstinting support throughout his
war with Iran. His crimes were never an issue. Not, that is, until he
miscalculated and invaded Kuwait in 1990 in another attempted land-grab. This
war, however, was not on the U.S. agenda, and Hussein�s reckless action
triggered an attack by the U.S. and Great Britain, along with the imposition of
UN sanctions. [2]
That Saddam Hussein was once regarded as a friend of the
West is rarely mentioned these days. As long as he directed internal repression
and external wars at those U.S. policy makers loathed, he could count on
support. It was only when his actions went against U.S. interests that he was
suddenly transformed into a tyrant and criminal. His methods had not changed.
Only the Western perception of him had shifted, because he no longer served the
purposes of global capital.
The U.S. did much to create Saddam Hussein and others like
him. It is impossible to avoid concluding that the trial of Saddam Hussein was
little more than a case of selective justice, meant to provide
post-justification for an invasion that was itself a grave violation of
international law. Saddam Hussein�s crimes were real enough, but those acts
would never have brought him to trial had he continued to operate within the
parameters sketched for him by the West.
The trial of Saddam Hussein is hailed as a triumph of
justice, despite the fact that it was initiated and guided by an occupying
power. Yet one wonders. Who will judge the Western powers that stand in
judgment?
NOTES
1. Richard Sale, �Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot,�
UPI, April 10, 2003.
2. �US and Iraq Go Way Back,� CBS News, December 31, 2002.
Patrick E. Tyler, �Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas,� New
York Times, August 18, 2002. Robert Windrem, �Rumsfeld Key Player in Iraq
Policy Shift,� MSNBC, August 18, 2000. Christopher Marquis, �Rumsfeld Made Iraq
Overture in �84 Despite Chemical Raids,� New York Times, December 23, 2003.
Michael Dobbs, �US-Iraq Ties in 1980s Illustrate Downside of American Foreign
Policy,� Dawn (Karachi), December 31, 2002. Jeremy Scahill, �The Saddam in
Rummy�s Closet,� Counterpunch, August 2, 2002.
Gregory
Elich is the author of "Strange
Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit." He is onthe Board of Directors of the Jasenovac
Research Institute and on the Advisory Board of the Korea Truth Commission. His
articles have appeared in newspapers and periodicals across the world,
including the U.S., Canada, South Korea, Great Britain, France, Zimbabwe,
Yugoslavia, Russia, Denmark and Australia.