Contemporary American politics is conducted in the shadow of
historical myths that inform our present-day choices. Unfortunately, these myths
sometimes lead us terribly astray.
Case in point is the popular idea that America�s economic
tradition has been economic liberty, laissez faire, and wide-open cowboy
capitalism. This notion sounds obvious, and it fits the image of this country
held by both the Right, which celebrates this tradition, and the Left, which
bemoans it. And it seems to imply, among other things, that free trade is the
American Way. Don�t Tread On Me or my right to import.
It is, in fact, very easy to construct an impressive-sounding
defense of free trade as a form of economic liberty on the basis of this myth. Unfortunately,
this myth is just that: a myth, not real history. The reality is that all four
of the four presidents on Mount Rushmore were protectionists. (Even the
pseudo-libertarian Jefferson came around after the War of 1812.) Historically,
protectionism has been, in fact, the real American Way.
This pattern even predates American independence. During the
colonial period, the British government tried to force its American colonies to
become suppliers of raw materials to the nascent British industrial
machine while denying them any manufacturing industry of their own. The
colonies were, in fact, the single biggest victim of British trade policy,
being under Britain�s direct political control, unlike its other trading
partners. The British knew exactly what they were doing: they were happy to see
America thrive, but only as a cog in their own industrial machine. As former
Prime Minster William Pitt, otherwise a famous conciliator of American
grievances and the namesake of Pittsburgh, once said in Parliament,
�If the Americans should manufacture a lock of wool or
a horse shoe, I would fill their ports with ships and their towns with troops.�
Thus the American Revolution was to some extent a
war over industrial policy, in
which the commercial elite of the Colonies revolted against being forced into
an inferior role in the emerging Atlantic economy. This is one of the things
that gave the American Revolution its exceptionally bourgeois character as
revolutions go, with bewigged Founding Fathers rather than the usual
unshaven revolutionary mobs.
It is no accident that after Independence, a tariff was the
very second bill signed by President Washington. It is also no accident that
the Constitution -- which notoriously does not authorize a great many
things our government does today -- explicitly does give Congress the
authority �to regulate commerce with foreign nations.� (Article I,
Section 8.) This fact drives flag-draped libertarians crazy, but there it is.
Protectionism�s first American theorist was Alexander
Hamilton -- the man on the $10 bill, the first Treasury Secretary, and
America�s first technocrat. As
aide-de-camp to General Washington during the Revolution, he had seen the U.S.
nearly lose due to lack of capacity to manufacture weapons. (France rescued
us with 80,000 muskets and other war materiel.) He worried that Britain�s lead
in manufacturing would remain entrenched, condemning the United States to
being a producer of agricultural products and raw materials. In modern terms, a
banana republic. As he put it in 1791:
The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations who have
preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry, constitutes a more formidable
obstacle than either of those which have been mentioned, to the introduction of
the same branch into a country in which it did not before exist. To maintain,
between the recent establishments of one country, and the long-matured
establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms, both as to
quality and price, is, in most cases, impracticable. The disparity, in the one,
or in the other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable, as to forbid
a successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and protection of
government.
Hamilton�s policies came down to about a dozen key
measures. In his own words:
1. �Protecting duties.� (Tariffs.)
2. �Prohibition of rival articles or duties equivalent to
prohibitions.� (Outright import bans.)
3. �Prohibition of the exportation of the materials of
manufactures.� (Export bans on raw materials needed for industrialization here
at home.)
4. �Pecuniary bounties.� (Export subsidies, like those
provided today by the Export-Import Bank and other programs.)
5. �Premiums.� (Subsidies for key innovations. Today,
we would call them research and development tax credits.)
6. �The exemption of the materials of manufactures from
duty.� (Import liberalization for industrial inputs, so some other
country can be the raw materials exporter and we can industrialize.)
7. �Drawbacks of the duties which are imposed on the
materials of manufactures.� (Same idea, by means of tax rebates.)
8. �The encouragement of new inventions and discoveries at
home, .and of the introduction into the United States of such as may have been
made in other countries; particularly those, which relate to machinery.�
(Prizes for inventions and, more importantly, patents.)
9. �Judicious regulations for the inspection of manufactured
commodities.� (Regulation of product standards, as the USDA and FDA do today.)
10. �The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to
place.� (A sophisticated financial system.)
11. �The facilitating of the transportation of commodities.�
(Good infrastructure.)
Hamilton set forth his case in his Report on
Manufactures, submitted to Congress in 1791. Perhaps the most
startling thing about his suggested policies is how modern they are: few people
realize that the R&D tax credit was first proposed in 1791!
Due in large part to the domination of Congress by Southern
planters, who favored free trade, Hamilton�s policies were not all adopted
right away. It took the War of 1812, which created a surge of anti-British
feeling, disrupted normal trade, and drastically increased the government�s
need for revenue, to push America firmly into the protectionist camp. But when
war broke out, Congress immediately doubled the tariff to an average of 25
percent. After the war, British manufacturers undertook one of the world�s
first cases of predatory dumping, whose purpose was, in the words of one Member
of Parliament, to �stifle in the cradle, those rising manufactures in the
United States, which the war had forced into existence.� In reaction, the
American industrial interests that had blossomed because of the tariff lobbied
to keep it, and had it raised to 35 percent in 1816. The public approved, and
by 1820, America�s average tariff was up to 40 percent.
Fast-forward a few years. Gloss over a number of important
tariff-related political struggles, such as the South
Carolina Nullification Crisis of 1832, one of the precursors of the Civil
War, in which South Carolina tried to reject a federal tariff. There was a
brief free trade episode starting in 1846, coinciding with the aforementioned
zenith of classical liberalism in Europe, during which America�s tariffs
were lowered. But this was followed by a series of recessions, ending in the
Panic of 1857, which brought demands for a higher tariff so intense that
President James Buchanan -- the last free-trade president for two generations
-- gave in and signed one two days before Abraham Lincoln took office in
1861.
Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and most of the other great names
from American history were all protectionists. Protectionism was, in fact,
Lincoln�s number two issue after slavery. As he put it in 1847, �Give us a
protective tariff, and we will have the greatest nation on earth.
Revealingly, the only major exception to America�s
protectionist consensus was the antebellum South, because free trade is the
ideal policy for a nation that actually wants to be an agricultural
slave state. An economy founded on slave-based agriculture has no hope of
achieving competitive advantage in anything else, as slaves have proven
unsuitable for industrialization since the time of Ancient Rome. Because the
tariff was the main source of federal revenue in those pre-income tax days, the
South also bore a disproportionate share of the nation�s tax burden. No wonder
it was in favor of free trade -- which the Confederate constitution eventually
mandated.
Back when protectionism was American policy, it enjoyed a
broad popular consensus. Only the left- and right-wing extremists of the day
dissented. Extreme right wing Social Darwinists like William Graham Sumner
-- who published a fuming book in 1885 entitled Protectionism, the Ism That
Teaches That Waste Makes Wealth -- saw protectionism as a subsidy for
the incompetent and an interference with the divine justice of the free market
and the survival of the fittest. At the other extreme, Karl Marx, who was alive
in those days and keenly watching American capitalism, wanted to see American
capitalism break down and therefore favored free trade for its destructive
potential.
Unfortunately for Marx, this was the golden age of American
industry, when America�s economic performance surpassed the rest of the world
by the greatest margin. It was the era in which the U.S. transformed itself
from a promising mostly agricultural backwater, pupil at the knee of European
industry, into the greatest economic power in the history of the world.
What happened to America�s long protectionist tradition? In
the end, America only seriously turned away from protectionism as a Cold War
gambit to prop up capitalist economies abroad and tie them to the U.S. Geopolitics
trumped domestic economics.
Ironically, our old protectionist playbook for economic
development is the same one, in many respects, that China and other nations are
using against the United States today. Back when we were the ascending economic
power in the late 19th century, it was Britain that
complained about �unfair trade!� They were right, of course -- but given that
nobody forced free trade upon them, it was their own fault. Today, having
forgotten our own history, we can�t even recognize the game being played
against us, let alone figure out how to counter it. We will continue to pay a
high price in lost jobs and declining industries until we wise up.
Ian Fletcher is the author of Free Trade Doesn�t Work: What
Should Replace It and Why (USBIC,
2010, $24.95) An Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S.
Business and Industry Council, a Washington think tank founded in 1933,
he was previously an economist in private practice, mostly serving hedge funds
and private equity firms. He may be contacted at ian.fletcher@usbic.net.