"The problem with
touch screens as vote counters is that they can be easily manipulated."
--Mike Devereaux, ES&S Sales Representative
Toward the end of
the twentieth century, Election Systems & Software (ES&S), which now
supplies election equipment to 39 states, was born into a world
enamored of technology -- a perfect opportunity in the wide-open business of
making and selling computerized election equipment. Voting integrity activists
were few and far between, and election officials had no reason to resist the
digitizing of election results. The field was a gold mine to be harvested.
But from the
beginning, whatever opportunity ES&S touched turned into a disaster. When their M100 ballot
scanners debuted in Hawaii in 1998, the machines failed so badly, ES&S had
to pay over half a million dollars to settle contract disputes and recount the
ballots. Simultaneously in Dallas, software bugs in their ES&S election equipment
lost 41,015 ballots -- one out of every eight.
Two years later,
flaws in the ES&S tabulating equipment caused Venezuela to postpone
"the biggest election in Venezuelan history."
Undaunted, ES&S
continued selling its wares and leaving a trail of election problems in its
wake -- flipping votes on the screens in Arkansas; counting more votes than
voters in San Francisco; giving votes to the wrong candidates in Florida,
Kansas, Texas; and irretrievably losing entire ballots. In September 2002,
Miami's new paperless touch screen machines, the ES&S iVotronics, lost 8.2
percent of the ballots in the 31 precincts that the ACLU examined -- losing as
many as 21 percent in some precincts.
Two months later,
in the mid-term elections in Raleigh, North Carolina, the election director
stopped using the iVotronics for early voting when they failed to record 436
ballots cast on the machines -- in a single day.
So two years later,
ES&S took their iVotronic software to Indiana and had it certified, but
instead of installing it there, they illegally installed an uncertified version
because, according to ES&S, the certified version "might not tabulate
votes." A frustrated Election Commissioner Anthony Long put his finger on
the heart of the problem when he asked ES&S, "Do you understand that
to run an election for something to work, it's gotta count the votes?"
Shortly thereafter, Indiana passed legislation providing stiff penalties for
election equipment vendors who act on their own without permission of the state
election commission.
But let's not get
ahead of ourselves. Those two years brought a whirlwind of election debacles
caused by ES&S equipment. In the 2002 mid-term election, ES&S ballot
scanners handed the Alabama gubernatorial election to the wrong candidate in a
mistake eventually caught by election officials. Their paperless touch screens
continued flipping votes in Florida, locking up and shutting down in Louisiana,
and providing questionable results wherever they were in use.
Their ballot
scanners reversed totals in the mid-term elections in Nebraska, North Carolina,
and South Dakota. And in 2003, the ES&S products continued to run amok,
reversing totals in Illinois and losing ballots in North Carolina.
Off to an early
start in their trail of 2004 fiascos, the iVotronics reported 134 blank ballots
in a south Florida election with a 12-vote margin of victory. There was only
one contest on the ballot, so if the tally is to be believed, 134 voters
trekked to the polls, signed in, and decided not to vote. At that time, Florida
required manual recounts for close elections such as this one, but since there
weren't any ballots to recount, the machines' tally stood.
Continuing along
the 2004 trail, ES&S equipment lost 189 ballots in Sarasota County,
Florida; balked at accumulating votes in San Antonio; failed to count them in
Lubbock; and counted candidates' votes for their opponents in several Arkansas
counties.
Mid-year, a Miami
election official reported that the audit log for the iVotronics, which was the
only method of checking the operation of the machines, had a software bug that
made the log unusable for its sole purpose -- auditing.
The same story
continued through the rest of the year. In addition to miscounting ballots in
Arkansas, Florida, Wyoming, Michigan, and Arizona; ES&S equipment flipped
votes on the screens in Texas, Ohio, and yes, Florida.
But there were also
some new twists in the ES&S twister that swept the country. In LaPorte
Indiana, the iVotronics recorded 300 votes in every precinct, eliminating over
50,000 ballots. In South Carolina, officials were unable to retrieve 200 votes
off the memory cartridges. In Wisconsin, ES&S ballot scanners failed to
count straight-party votes at all. In Nebraska, Ohio, and Washington, they
added votes to the totals. And in Indiana, the iVotronics recorded more votes
than voters (called "phantom votes) in some precincts, fewer ballots than
voters in others.
One of the most
interesting twists, however, is the "counting backwards" phenomenon
that cropped up in Florida and North Carolina. For some inexplicable reason,
ES&S set up its software to handle vote totals ranging from 32,000 to
-32,000 -- yes, negative 32,000, as if there might at some point be negative
totals. And there were. As the totals in three southern counties exceeded
32,000, the software flipped into negative mode and began counting backwards.
Two thousand five
saw more of the same . . . and more. Lost votes and switched votes in Florida
and Mississippi, straight-party votes uncounted in Wisconsin and Michigan,
phantom votes in South Carolina and Florida. And even a new thing -- the county
commissioner's race simply didn't appear on some �not all, but some -- of the
electronic ballots in a Broward County, Florida, election.
Onward to 2006, as ES&S
equipment continues counting votes backwards, leaving others uncounted, and
adding votes cast by phantoms. The company continues installing outdated
software -- in West Virginia this time. The ballot programming they provide for
the 2006 primary fails to count the votes properly in dozens of jurisdictions across
many states.
And new problems
continue to arise. Flawed programming gives voters the wrong electronic
ballots, the company misprints paper ballots and supplies faulty memory
cartridges to its customers, and customers discover that the tally software
refuses to combine vote totals from iVotronics and ballot-scanners.
As things heat up
with the frantic rush to comply with federal law before the November 2006
elections, ES&S expands its dysfunctionality. The company violates
contracts -- refusing to provide ballot programming services in Arkansas and
California on the one hand, and inspiring the Oregon Secretary of State to file
a lawsuit on the other. ES&S fails to deliver equipment and services as
agreed -- inspiring legal complaints in both Indiana and West Virginia.
Meanwhile, ES&S
manages to turn a goldmine into a disaster as it delivers faulty AutoMARKS -- a
ballot-marking device marketed by ES&S and endorsed by voting integrity
activists -- to customers such as Wyoming and New Mexico while it fails to
deliver them on time in other states.
With news reports
of ES&S failures in at least 15 states in the November
2006 election, it's difficult to keep up now with all the elections ES&S
has turned into chaos, so let's skip right to the latest fiascos.
Three races hang in
the balance in Benton County, Arkansas.
A week after the election, outcomes have shifted three times, but reports of
more than 100 percent turnout in some precincts make officials leery of the
results, and even ES&S has trouble figuring out the true totals. Will even
the winners believe the final results?
And there's more!
In Waldenburg, Arkansas, a mayoral
candidate who voted for himself on an iVotronic finds that the machines
reported no votes at all in his column. Meanwhile, officials in Sarasota County,
Florida, speculate about why 18,000 votes for the U.S. House
District 13 race don't show up on the tally -- in a contest with a 368-vote
margin. One vote out of 36 lost in Waldenburg; 18,000 out of 140,000 missing in
Sarasota. Different in degree, but not much different in kind.
ES&S breaks
contracts, installs illegal software, fails to deliver equipment on time,
delivers faulty equipment, and misprograms ballots. Their equipment heats up,
breaks down, operates badly, and fails to operate at all. Every product the
company makes malfunctions in its own special way -- miscounting votes, adding
votes, subtracting votes, doubling votes, losing votes, mis-scanning ballots,
and/or flipping votes from one candidate to another.
ES&S products
fail again and again at the one thing they are supposed to do -- count votes
correctly. With hurricane ES&S gathering speed in every election, we can
only wonder . . . why are their systems still in use, and what will be next?
An extensive
compendium of problems with ES&S election equipment, with links to media
articles, can be found here and here
This article originally appeared on VotersUnite!
Ellen Theisen was the founder and original
Executive Director of VotersUnite! In her 22-year career as a software
technical writer, she has written hundreds of user manuals, functional and
design specifications, online help systems, and programmer guides. Early in
2004, Ellen wrote "Myth Breakers for Election Officials" to dispel
myths about HAVA and inform decision-makers of important, under-publicized
facts about electronic voting issues.