�But the central role afforded Zarqawi, both in 2003 and now, is as tendentious as many of the other suppositions that undergird the administration's Iraq policy. The evidence offered to support the administration's assessment of Zarqawi as a driver of the Iraqi insurgency and top lieutenant of bin-Laden is reminiscent, in form and substance, of the spurious evidence regarding Iraq weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, some of the sources may be the same.� [From articles complied by the Project on Defense Alternatives]

How did the political contradictions of Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim play in his assassination by the United States?

Before the invasion, and after many negotiation sessions conducted by America�s man, Chalabi, with al-Hakim who was living in Iran at that time, Hakim wavered when finally confronted by the prospect that the U.S. had effectively decided to invade his own country. While he feebly deemed the invasion �unnecessary," he, nevertheless, did not oppose it vigorously enough to stop it by waving the threat that should the U.S. invade Iraq, the Shiite clergy would issue an edict to fight the invaders.

The meaning of Hakim�s political posturing toward the planned American invasion was evident: he was accepting it in principle. In fact, in October 2002, Hakim sent his brother Abdul-Aziz to London to meet with an American delegation presided over by the Afghani-American Zionist neocon Zalmai Khalilzad (current colonial ruler of Iraq), and attended by America�s man: Iraqi-born (dual American-British citizenship) and CIA collaborator Ahmad Chalabi.

Since he did not oppose the invasion, and since he became an American tool to invade Iraq, Hakim�s task became obvious: he and the Shiite clergy must make sure that once the United States invades Iraq, Iraqi Arab Shiite Muslims would not fight the invaders. In fact, after the invasion, and despite minor confrontations between al-Sadr followers and the United States, the Shiite community of Iraq followed the edicts of Sistani and Hakim and never fought the invaders of Iraq.

In exchange for what did Hakim sell out Iraq? Answer: getting rid of his personal enemy, Saddam, was one; the other was a plan for exclusive Shiite control in post-Saddam Iraq. But, how could Hakim believe that the U.S. would allow a Shiite theocracy in Iraq? Hakim appeared to have made an agreement with the Americans based on two objectives: a clergy rule under the protection of the occupiers, and 2) in exchange for that, he accepted to forgo the wider objective of an Islamic state, a cause for which he declared war against the government of Hussein.

As I said earlier in this series, after the International whores � among other definitions, the American Heritage Dictionary defines �whore� as, �person considered as having compromised principles for personal gain � of the Security Council: France, Russia, and China sanctioned the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq, Baqir al-Hakim raised his voice for the first time.

Global Security.org, a website tied to U.S. militarism and to the imperialist project in the Middle East, wrote the following:

�Initially Sayed Al-Hakim was critical of the occupation. In May, at a rally in Al-Nasiriyah, he portrayed the occupation as a danger to Iraqi national identity. "Do the Americans accept it if the English govern their country, even though they share a similar culture? How can we accept a foreign government whose language is different than ours, whose skin is different than ours? Oh brothers, we will fight and fight so that the government we have is independent, that it is Iraqi," he said. [Italics added] [Source]

We require no extraordinary intuition to conclude that with his statement, �Oh brothers, we will fight and fight so that the government we have is independent, that it is Iraqi� Hakim sealed his horrific fate, despite his re-alignment with the AOR (American Occupation Regime).

Consequently, we need to ask many questions. Did Hakim read the mind of the U.S. crusading imperialists? Did he not know that any one who could pronounce these words publicly would pose a potential danger to the stability of the occupation? Did he not figure out that his physical elimination would be an insurance policy against such an eventuality?

To give you an example on the intellectual confusion of most of the Shiite clergy on complex subjects such as imperialism and colonialism, pay attention to Hakim�s phrase: �How can we accept a foreign government whose language is different than ours, whose skin is different than ours?� Let us extract some meaning out of Hakim�s words.

One: Did Hakim mean that if the invaders have the same color and language as himself and other Iraqis, he would have welcomed them?

Two: Hakim seemed to have been ignorant of the ethnic makeup of the American society and armed forces. In terms of skin color and language, a half of the American invading forces have skin color similar to his, and many soldiers are of Arab descent. Language, however, is not relevant today -- thousands of Arabs and Iraqi traitors and profiteers of war are working with the invaders as translators and interpreters thus obliterating language barriers. In addition, U.S. invaders could rule by means of powerless surrogates like his brother, Abdul-Aziz without having to speak Arabic.

As for Muqtada al-Sadr, a dynastic religious figure without any political substance or experience in anti-colonial wars of liberation, the ignorance of imperialism as a force of history is not only perplexing, but also dangerous, seeing the many failed confrontations (not uprisings) with the American occupiers. An example: after the invasion, al-Sadr declared, �I do not believe that the sons of Maryam [Mary, mother of Jesus], came to occupy us.� Al-Sadr�s cultural ignorance was evident � he thought of the U.S. as an exclusive Christian country!

To summarize, getting rid of Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in that demonstrative pyrotechnical explosion that killed over ninety people with him and wounded many others, would serve multiple purposes:

• Communicate to the Iraqis who supported the U.S. invasion for selfish and misguided objectives, that pre-invasion talks and alliances were only tactical in nature (Bush and Zionists used Shiite and Kurdish personalities to support the invasion, but propagandistically extended that personal support as a mandate by their respective peoples, which was far from true.)
  
  
• Send a signal to Iraqi Shiite religious leadership that the U.S. did not invade Iraq to give it to them to form a state that, by its nature and confessional affinity to Iran, is anathema to U.S. imperialism and Israel.
  
  
• Partitioning Iraq on ethnical, as well as, on confessional lines requires a multi-stage stratagem with gradual escalation so as not to raise world suspicions that, indeed, the U.S. invaded Iraq to partition it. Consequently, igniting a confessional war between Iraqi Arabs was a necessary technical step toward achieving that partition if the U.S. were to achieve its plan for the re-design of the �Wider Middle East�

Further, to dispel any doubt on the sequence I just outlined, pay attention to this: 1) the U.S. through Noah Feldman, a Zionist lawyer from New York, who wrote the Iraqi �constitution," introduced the idea of federalism which, of course, occupied Iraqis approved and Kurds, taking it as a first step to secession from Iraq, approved as well. Today, the project of federalism (partition, Bush style) is near completion, and with Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim (Mohammad Baqir�s brother), Kurds, pro-occupation communists, and the Sunni Muslim Brothers are the material instrument to reach it.

As we are about to analyze the assassination of Hakim, two aspects of post-invaded Iraq are worth mentioning:

One: since March 19, 2003, (the start of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq) and up to August 19, 2003, (the assassination of Hakim), the Iraqi people were yet to realize the impact, consequences, and objectives of the invasion that brought with it the complete destruction of all apparatuses of the Iraqi state except the ministry of oil.

Two: until the day of Hakim�s assassination, all what the United States had managed to achieve in terms of creating a mortal Sunni-Shiite struggle, was limited to inseminating the seeds of what the U.S. and its media called began to call, �sectarian violence." Bluntly, though, so-called Iraqi sectarian violence is not but the violent American social engineering of Iraqi society to pattern it according to the plans of Zionist hyper-imperialism.

I shall now discuss four views on the killing of Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim. Our task is to investigate whether �al-Qaeda� or �Zarqawi� appear in them. But most importantly, we shall attempt to see how the United States was building up the scheme of Zarqawi as a material instrument to a macro-project: confessional war that leads to partition. Of course, this is the American plan; but citing an Arabic proverb here is mandatory: �Tajree al-riyahu bimala tash-tahi al-sufunu.� Translation: Often, winds would blow in a direction not liked by ships.

A view from British imperialism

The �sophisticated� voice of British imperialism (the Guardian) published an obituary on al-Hakim. The author described the attack as follows, �He [al-Hakim] had just finished a sermon on the need for Iraqi unity and was emerging from the gold-domed shrine of Imam Ali when he and at least 75 others were hit by a massive car-bomb explosion.�

Based on the above, now we know that it was a car-bomb explosion (the hallmark of Israeli operations in Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere) at killing al-Hakim and many of his followers. Who were the perpetrators? It suffices to say that in a country that U.S. made lawless after dissolving the Iraqi army and police force, anyone could place a bomb somewhere and then detonate it.

First, it was by design that among all those who could have written an obituary on al-Hakim, the Guardian selected Lawrence Joffe to do the job. But Joffe is a Zionist. Hence, the obituary he wrote would necessarily be a reflective surface of Zionist causes. For your information, Joffe is a correspondent for the Website: MERIA (Middle East Review of International Affairs.) In turn, MERIA connects to Zionism via its editor and publisher, Barry Rubin (author of, Cauldron of Turmoil, a massive Zionist �bible� on the Middle East) As a means to spread disinformation rapidly, Rubin offers the visitors of his website to read a synopsis of his book, free of charge � a sort of a Zionist �generosity�!

In writing the obituary, Joffe inserted a theory that carries the hallmark of the Israeli design to partition Iraq through the back ally of inter-Shiite infighting. The focal point of Joffe�s theory is the following: �Al-Sadr's acolytes repudiate the right of "exiles," like Hakim, to assume natural leadership of the Iraqi Shiites. Some say they represent a generational challenge to the older Shiite opposition. Rumours have associated al-Sadr's men with a recent unsuccessful assassination attempt on al-Hakim's uncle, Grand Ayatollah Seyed Mohammed Said al-Hakim.�

Analysis

One: to his credit, Joffe, who presented Israeli conspiracy theories as a plausible explanation for the assassination of al-Hakim, did not involve the ubiquitous �al-Qaeda," �Zarqawi," or �Islamic terrorism� in the assassination.

Two: For all those who among us follow how Zionist strategists think and act, it is not that arduous to read into the insinuations that Joffe made on the killing of al-Hakim. He used allusions and speculation to identify the killers as in his words and compounds, �to assume," �some say," and �rumors." In other words, he elected fabrication as a substitute for researched factual evidence.

Joffe�s assignment for writing the �propaganda-obituary� was all too evident: his intent was to shift the readers� attention from any intellectual investigation of all possible culprits and confine it in one tight corner: inter-Shiites infighting for power. Joffe was telling us, then, to discard analysis and adopt a politically motivated judgment.

This is a pedantic indoctrination: how did Joffe deduce that al-Sadr followers killed al-Hakim? Joffe explained his �investigative acumen� with the following theorization: �With hindsight, it should have been obvious that al-Hakim's life was in danger. For milling amongst May's throng in Najaf were supporters of the 29-year-old Ayatollah Moqtada al-Sadr. The younger sheikh is the son of the late Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, murdered in 1999. He is said to represent radicalised urban Shiites who dwell in Sadr City - formerly Saddam City - in Baghdad.�

What Joffe was explicitly implying is that, radicalized urban Arab Shiites killed al-Hakim. There is a problem though: even if we are willing to consider such a proposition, where is the investigation to back it up? Where is cogency, logical connectivity of motivation, background, history, arguments, or counter-arguments? Of course, Joffe is not concerned with these questions. For him the objectives are threefold: 1) exclude the U.S. and Israel from the list of suspects, 2) attribute the killing to other Shiites, and 3) give the impression that terrorism had become the norm in Iraq.

Interestingly, as you will read soon in part 13, Joffe�s statement, �With hindsight, it should have been obvious that al-Hakim's life was in danger," will be reprised by another Zionist, William O. Beeman, who, writing on al-Hakim�s assassination, will amplify Joffe�s theory and bring it to new heights. From there on, you would begin to see �Zarqawi� in the horizons of Iraq.

A view from U.S. imperialism: media

As a Zionist-imperialist medium, CNN obsequiously followed the play devised by U.S. occupation planners whose job is to depict occupied Iraq as a normal country with minor problems. Following this play, CNN cited the Iraqi �police� to validate its theories on the assassination of al-Hakim.

But CNN had conveniently forgotten that the United States deliberately dissolved the Iraqi police force a few months earlier. Categorically, therefore, there was no organized or legitimate police force at that time. In its place, the U.S. created a ragtag paramilitary force made from volunteers seeking jobs to overcome hardship caused by the occupation.

Iraqi �police� said CNN! But, why did CNN use the diction, �Iraqi �police," while it is public knowledge that said �police� lack all attributes of a national force with organized hierarchy, training, and civic purpose? Answer: to give the impression � primarily to the American public � that Iraq had returned to normal and that its institutions work independently from the occupation regime.

Inquisitively, what did this so-called Iraqi police (screened and selected based on the sole criteria not to oppose or fight the American occupation) say?

CNN dispatch from Iraq stated,� Iraqi police have arrested two men believed to be Pakistanis -- with possible connections to al Qaeda -- who they suspect are tied to Friday's deadly car bombing at one of the Shiite Muslims' most revered mosques, the governor of Najaf said Saturday.

CNN presented three pieces of �evidence� on the identity of the detonators who killed al-Hakim. If we put these pieces sequentially as CNN reported them, we have, 1) �two men believed to be Pakistanis," 2) �with possible connections to al Qaeda, and 3) �who they suspect are tied to Friday�s deadly. . . . etc.

Let us challenge this dispatcher: �Mr. Dispatcher, who supplied you with that �irrefutable� evidence that you darted at us?� Without waiting for an answer, there can be no doubt that, if a decent American court were to examine such articles of evidence as presented by CNN, it would send their proponents to jail just for suggesting them because someone out there is trying to ridicule the intelligence of the court.

Who supplied the �evidence� to CNN, anyway?

Surprise: it was the governor of Najaf. For your information, this �governor," according to widely circulated information coming from Iraq was a street bully who self-appointed himself for the post and the U.S. accepted him because he served its purpose.

CNN, however, inadvertently, supplies the clue as to why the United States killed Hakim. In the middle of the dispatch, CNN stated that the killing could fuel sectarian violence. With another dispatch entitled: Fears raised of sectarian violence, CNN was actually acknowledging that the ultimate purpose for killing al-Hakim was a sectarian war among the Iraqis.

The question is, �Who would benefit from such a war?� Answer: no one except the United States, since a war amidst an intermingled society such as the Iraqi society would be a catastrophe to all warring parties. On the other hand, a sectarian war would benefit in a million ways the occupying power. This is a powerful reason for the U.S. to kill Hakim. In the end, since after the time, the phrase: Sectarian violence, entered regularly into the American vocabulary; meaning, �Sectarian violence� was a constant objective of the Nazi neocons of George Bush.

Next, I shall discuss the two remaining views on Hakim�s assassination: Arab press, and Zionist doctrinaires

Next: Part 13 of 23

B. J. Sabri is an Iraq-American antiwar activist. Email: bjsabri@yahoo.com

Previously published