To the best of memory, one of the first authors, whom I
respect, to shed doubts on the possibilities of an American military attack on
Iran was Tariq Ali.
In an article, on Counterpunch (May 11, 2006), he argued
succinctly that Iran had been nothing but helpful to the American colonial
ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, why would the Americans attack Iran and
turn a huge helping asset in the region into a colossal hostility, which would,
in turn, make Americans� presence in the region far more hellish?
A lot of Iranian socialists, liberals, radical democrats and
plenty of people in the clerical and merchant classes, as well as millions of
ordinary citizens know that the ruling classes in the U.S., divided as they are
over attacking Iran militarily, are united in preferring an Islamic Republic,
rather than a secular republic, in Iran. The American rulers know, or at least
calculate, that any other political formation in Iran will definitely be
socially to the left of the current set up. The mullahs also know that the
Americans know this. So, both are clear on this.
Those of us who grew up under the Shah�s dictatorship used
to think that he was the limit, but of course leave it up to the clergymen, the
ideological singing birds of the ruling classes in Iran for the past one
thousand years and more, to come up with an infinitely improved dictatorship,
something the Pahlavi �dynasty� could only dream about (the �dynasty� was a
mere two kings long; both took power through Western-supported coups; I�d call
it �foreign investment,� not �dynasty�).
In terms of a sufficiently thorough dictatorial set up,
then, beneficial to anybody wishing to do business (wink, wink) with Iran,
Western imperialists cannot have it any better than the regime that exists
there; they don�t want this regime to disappear. So, if and when talking regime
change, they mean merely a change of behavior. The major differences between
the American and the Iranian regimes revolve around the terms and conditions
under which the Islamic Republic will continue to rule.
Over the recent years of the verbal back and forth between
the ugly duckling Uncle Sam and bad, bad ayatollahs, I have noticed a curious
side-correlation. The rise in the level of belligerent talk directed at Iran
coming out of Washington has usually accompanied a rise of violence in Iraq.
Every time the Americans experience intensified resistance from the Iraqis,
there is a surge of accusations regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions and �meddling
So, one can imagine that what the U.S. administration is
really saying is that the Iranian regime and their capable military and paramilitary
presence, in terms of personnel and influence in Iraq, are not doing enough to
keep the violence under an acceptable level; �acceptable� meaning here, a level
which can still be spun somehow positively in the establishment mass media in
the West, particularly in the U.S.
(So, for example, right now, due to Iranian exertion of
influence, as thoroughly reported by Patrick Cockburn, Sadr�s militia�s have
been given stand-down orders. This has partly been responsible for the �relative
success� of the so-called surge of American military forces into the Baghdad
area. In such a context, a death rate of more than 550 per month in Iraq, in
the American mass media, can be presented as a �success.� In order for this
death rate to be presented as progress, the Iranian regime has done its fare
share. No wonder then that, diplomatically, the Iranians act like the Americans
owe them something; which they indeed do!)
Mixed in with the nuclear-related accusations, when
attacking Iran verbally, has always been the issue of Iranian military
involvement in Iraq. Starting at least since 2004, we have heard accusations of
�Iranian meddling� by U.S. military and political leaders. That these
accusations of �foreign meddling� are forwarded by a mercenary army of more
than 350,000 (including the contractors) who flew or sailed thousands of miles
to get to Iraq is of course totally beside the point.
The factual truth, however, is very different. The Americans
knew from the very start of the invasion�s planning stages that the Iranians
would be there; in fact, during the aerial bombardments and the initial land
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the American military was coordinating with the
Iranian-based Badr brigades, which meant coordinating with the Iranian
So far as Iranian �meddling� goes then, the Americans were relying on it to achieve their own
politico-military objectives in Iraq. So, to now turn their presence in Iraq
into an excuse to attack Iran is not just outrageous, it is in fact insane.
Would the U.S. not intervene in Mexico if one of the European countries, say,
Russia, or, who�s kidding whom, even if Belize
Consider this, though. If the Iranian regime were truly
anti-imperialist, here was a perfect opportunity for Iran to do to the U.S. a
milder version of what the U.S. had done to the Soviet Union; slowly bleed them
But, the Iranian regime has done no such thing because in
their calculations the Americans have solved two of their strategic problems
for them, by getting rid of the Taliban to the east and Saddam to the west. A
broken Afghanistan and a broken Iraq, along with a huge American military
presence on two of its borders with enormously destabilizing effects; all these
have brought lots of problems for the Iranian government. Yet, the plus side
has outpaced the negative by strides. In short, the Iranian regime does not
have an unambiguous anti-imperialist stance vis-�-vis the U.S; in fact, at key
junctures it has moved quite pro-imperialistically.
As relates to the U.S. side, Zbigniew Brzezinski is as well
an established heavyweight as there has ever been in contemporary political
life of American capitalism. His share in the architectural design of the late
twentieth century posture of U.S. imperialism vis-�-vis the Soviet Union, and
in particular his role in militarization and destabilization of Afghanistan,
starting in the late 1970s, is well known. As well, he was and is a big
supporter of the �adventures� in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Most recently, Brzezinski has reiterated that the Iranian
regime must be engaged diplomatically by the U.S. and not belligerently, while
talking like a bully. This stance is consistent with his pronouncement back in
the late 1970s that Ayatollah Khomeini was a man the U.S. could consider a
strategic ally. Remember his �Green Belt� strategy? Well, the late ayatollah
fit right in the buckle of the belt.
Western imperialists plan ahead and do have enormous
resources to employ as they adapt to changed situations. Chance does favor
those better prepared; especially when those chances are created by the better
I believe that, as regards to Iran�s place within the larger
capitalist regional system of the Middle East, a strategic thinking has been in
place for a long time in Washington. The strategic thinking from the time of
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and since the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam
Hussein, was to break Iraq as the independent actor that it had become. The
strategic position has been to keep the theocratic regime, and get it to change
some of its policies.
Iran may talk big about anti-imperialism, but it has
cooperated with the U.S. at strategic junctures. The ayatollahs helped the
Afghan mujaheddin from their early
days (cooperating with the U.S.); they helped the Reagan administration get
money for the Contra army to harass and terrorize a truly revolutionary
government in Nicaragua; later still, they facilitated the U.S. invasions of
both Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Iranian regime, like most other countries, knows that
there are clear limits to the U.S. military power, and that the U.S. rulers
need cooperative regional client states. And the American policy makers know well
the price for a successful looking reorganization of Iraq: with the helpful
hand of the Iranians, they can make a show case of the �success� of the U.S.�s
power projections, military and otherwise, oh so beneficial for the �stability�
of the region and for its future prospects for economic development; all of it
privatized, securitized and stashed away in fat Western banks.
The fact is, as Gary Leupp among others has explained, the
U.S. ruling class is divided over whether or not to militarily push the mullahs
a bit further, so as to extract the concessions they are seeking. Likewise, the
regime in Iran is very much divided over how to approach the Americans.
However, the Iranian theocrats have a unique problem when it comes to this one
If there is one
bit of legitimacy that holds the Islamic Republic as something unique --
compared to the Pahlavi regime, which the people overthrew -- it is their �anti-imperialist,�
or more specifically anti-American-imperialist, stance (they do lots of
economic and other dealings with many European powers).
In terms of lack of democracy and the presence of violently
repressive measures taken by the state to maintain control, the mullahs are far
more effective than anything the Shah could put together. Additionally, in
terms of economic mismanagement, they have done thousands of times worse than
the Shah, who at least could deliver an economic �development plan� that froze
the inflation rate to lower single digits for some 20 years.
The mullahs, on the other hand, have produced inflation
rates in the hundreds of percents per year, for decades; the poverty rate is
above 50 percent; class A drug addiction, in a country of 68 million, is
crippling the lives and aspirations of some 8 million (a conservative
estimate); meanwhile, the clerical and merchant ruling classes, who are not by
any measure of imagination productive and purely speculative in their economic
activities, are building giant mansions on choice real estate around Iran, and luxury
villas and houses around the world, while padding bigger Swiss bank accounts.
So, if they were to give up their anti-Americanism, their
last shred of a fig leaf, what else would they have that shows any improvement on the previous regime
to prove their legitimacy? Nothing!
Still, there is a very strong �realist� faction (yeah, we
have them, too) within the regime that has wanted for a long time to ditch all
pretence of anti-American posturing, and get on with the business of doing
business. This faction includes big establishment figureheads such as Hashemi
Rafsenjani and Khatami, and has a strong social appeal among swaths of the
middle classes and professionals ideologically supportive of the regime, and
among those ideologically neutral, and the support runs even as deep as
mid-ranking Revolutionary Guards officers.
The Americans know this, as do the Europeans. If this were
not the case, there would not be any backdoor negotiations, nor would there be
any overt overtures such as sending Undersecretary of State William Burns to
the nuclear negotiations underway in Geneva, last month.
The bottom line is, again, that the Americans as well as the
Europeans do not want a complete regime change in Iran (at least not for
awhile), but merely a change of behavior by the existing regime.
All of this leads one to conclude that if a military attack does take place, it is because the U.S.
administration of George Bush (or McCain or Obama) has reached the conclusion
that the only way to force the �behavior change� is by splitting the Iranian regime through a military shock, thus nudging
the pro-American faction to take more decisive actions in the fog of the chaos.
Any military attack by the U.S. would be done in the spirit of splitting the
Iranian regime and forcing a regime self-adjustment or fine-tuning.
A final point is to pay attention to what is entailed in �normalization.�
To a lot of people, normalization is a very soothing diplomatic term. It forms
the artificial antonym of �attack.� An �attack� on Iran is strictly defined to
be something that can happen only militarily. The economic attacks, meanwhile,
are not even registered on the liberals� and most leftists� radars. Yet, the
economic interests are the real motivation driving the aggressive diplomatic
postures as well as the threats or actual uses of military harassment.
When discussing �normalization� of relations, what are we
really talking about? We are talking about allowing a certain market to be
penetrated by certain Western economic interests. The economic interests should
be self-evident, and the recent announcements by Iranian government officials
regarding new laws allowing unlimited foreign ownership rights in Iranian firms
and resources is a clear enough indication that the current regime is willing
and able to accommodate all Western needs. Last month, it was reported that
Iran�s deputy minister of commerce, Gazanfari, declared to a South Korean
delegation that, �The volume of foreign investment in Iran is not subject to
any limitation,� (see, No limits on foreign investment in Iran).
The second plank of �normalization,� in the particular case
of the U.S., is the restoration of full diplomatic relations, with embassies
and the works. This means the return of American spies to Iran, under full
legal protection, which, according to a knowledgeable source, is usually a
precondition for relational normalization with Uncle Sam.
Curiously enough, as pertains to the second plank, that same
knowledgeable source, who always speaks on the condition of anonymity, recently
said that a �reunion� in Iran of ex-CIA-agents was in the works during the Clinton
presidency, right after Madeline Albright gave the closest the U.S. has ever
come to an official apology to the Iranians for overthrowing a democratically
elected prime minister of ours, Mossadegh, back in 1953. This reunion was to
bring together in Tehran all those who, in decades past during the heyday of
the Shah�s regime, worked in Iran as different professionals (bankers,
businessmen, academics, Peace Corp volunteers, etc.), all of whom worked for
the CIA in one form or another, providing it with necessary information it
needed from different fields and perspectives.
According to this source, the former Iranian president,
Bani-Sadr, got wind of this and passed the word around, and once the stink
began to rise too much, the reunion was canceled. It was later reported that
the reunion was canceled because the attendees were fearful that while in Iran
their communications would be monitored (Duh!) by the Iranian security
Iran has a magnificent geography, ranging from lush,
forested mountains to deserts, and everything in between. The country is
populated with warm, articulate (even when clueless), generous (even when
poor), kind people, whose urban populations are mostly strong xenophiles (not xenophobes). Of course, we, too, have greedy, lustful, vain, nasty,
lying, cheating, treacherous and violent folks. But to top the positives, we
have great food, from the best vegan dishes to the best recipes for turning beef
into the most delicious kebobs.
Not to forget that the most respectable part of it all,
perfectly corruptible officials. So, as you see, Iran is a heaven of sorts for expat
Western �experts� in the service of intelligence agencies.
Understandably, such professionals are impatiently lining
the corridors of the American intelligence and foreign services, ready to be
deployed to their posts of choice in any of the very desirable locations around
Iran. These days, they know they can even enjoy the added delights of temporary
sighe brides, should they wish to
These professionals are all the way for �normalization�; as
is Sen. Biden, as is Brzezinski and the entire �realist� wing of American
imperialism; as are some �leftist� organizations such as CASMII, which,
consciously or unconsciously, have become unofficial lobbyists for the Islamic
Republic; all of whom, and their NGO brothers and sisters, toast their drinks and
clink their glasses to the soon-please-come-quick detente that would bring them back to Eye-ran, with pockets full of
grant money from the CIA, NSA, State Dept., or whomever, salivating all over
the scene, padding resumes, telling us how to dig holes and plant things we
have planted for thousands of years.
Regime change would
not bode well for imperialists
The Iranian people, free from imperialist interference, will
change their regime, as they have been trying to do peacefully for some time
now. Iranians are not deeply religious (in the strict, establishmentarian sense
of the term), though the current regime does have a sizeable and clearly well
organized (since they have the state) minority of supporters. But, this
support, according to regime�s own men (e.g., Hashemi Rafsanjani) adds up to at
most 15 percent of the population. The 85 percent of the population not
actively with the regime is the unknown, and therefore the variable, factor.
Iranians have in fact a deep-rooted tradition of skepticism toward religious thought,
something that has been aesthetically best expressed by our great poets
historically. Further, we have a strong tendency toward an egalitarian society.
Long before Saint Simon, Proudhon, Robert Owen, or Babeuf, and long before Marx,
Engels or Lenin, we had Mazdak
(died c. 524 a.d.), a popular
figure in our historical consciousness, who was against the established and
corrupt clerical hierarchy of his own days, and advocated for public ownership
of all resources as well as for eradication of classes.
Our history and our egalitarian natural inclinations are
known to both the Iranian regime as well as to the Westerners, and they know
that any opening of the gates will unleash a situation, the outcome of which
can be a big loss to big business and a huge setback to imperialists� strategic
designs for our country. So, they will try their best to keep the gates closed
by keeping the current regime in power, with certain adjustments, which will be
extracted one way or another.
Socialists worldwide, and particularly in the Middle East
and Iran, must persist on a line of thinking that demands the independence of
Iran (or any Third World county) from Western imperialism in all its forms; we must consistently
demand freedom from threats of military attacks and freedom from a �normalization� that enslaves the people of
Iran, or any other nation, society or community, to Western economic interests.
Reza Fiyouzat can be reached at: firstname.lastname@example.org.