As Americans ponder how to get the U.S. out of its current
trade mess, we are constantly warned to do nothing -- like impose a tariff to
neutralize Chinese currency manipulation -- that would trigger a �trade war.�
Supposedly, no matter how bad our problems with our trading
partners get, they are less bad than the spiraling catastrophe that would ensue
if we walked a single inch away from our current policy of unilateral free
trade.
But the curious thing about the concept of trade war is
that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent. In fact, the
reality is that there has never been a
significant trade war, �significant� in the sense of having done serious
economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best.
The standard example free traders give is that America�s
Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it
spread around the world. But this canard does not survive serious examination,
and has actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually
researched the question in depth -- a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the
left to Milton Friedman on the right.
The Depression�s cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the
late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it
collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed
to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it.
As for the charge that Smoot
caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have
plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third
of America�s trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on
dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump.
Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up
in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the
recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff
increases.
Neither does the myth of a death spiral of retaliation by foreign nations hold water. According to
the official State Department report on this question in 1931: With the
exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination
against American commerce is very slight . . . By far the largest number of
countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any
way.
�Notorious� Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth,
plain and simple.
There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the
very concept of trade war. If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial
whether or not one�s trading partners
reciprocate, then why would any rational nation start one, no matter how
provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments
like the Chinese and the U.S. -- governments which, whatever bad things they
may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking
each other over trivial spats -- are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren.
When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other
nations currently running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the
financial realpolitik of exaggerated
retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade
back into balance, they will discover the advantage is with us, not them. Because
they are the ones with trade
surpluses to lose, not us. So our position of weakness is actually a position
of strength.
Supposedly, China can suddenly stop buying our Treasury debt
if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the
trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their
hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that
America and China are still benign economic �partners� in a win-win economic
relationship.
At the end of the day, China cannot force us to do anything
economically that we don�t choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can
-- an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them
(or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate countermove to anything they
might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the
interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary
Donald Regan.
A certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and
loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in
trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, but
that�s it. After all, the world trading system has survived their trade
barriers long enough without collapsing.
Ian Fletcher is the author of the new book Free
Trade Doesn�t Work: What Should Replace It and Why (USBIC, $24.95) He is an Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of
the U.S. Business and Industry Council, a Washington think tank founded in 1933.
He was previously an economist in private practice, mostly serving hedge funds
and private equity firms. He may be contacted at ian.fletcher@usbic.net.