Yet more haunting images of blindfolded, stripped down
Palestinian men being contemptuously dragged by soldiers in uniform from one
place to another. Yet more footage of bloodied men lying on hospital beds
describing their ordeals to television reporters who have heard this story all
too often. Yet more news of Palestinian infighting, tit-for-tat arrests,
obscene language and embarrassing behaviour from those who have elected
themselves -- or were elected -- to represent the Palestinian people.
Once again, the important story that ought to matter the
most -- that of a continually imposing and violent Israeli occupation -- is
lost in favour of Palestinian-infused distractions, deliberate or not.
In Gaza, the story of the Israeli siege, which represents
one of today�s most catastrophic man-made disasters, is ignored in favour of
renewed infighting between Hamas and Fatah, whether directly or by proxy. As
always, the Gaza story is largely told with biased and presumptive undertones:
to indict one party as terrorist and extremist and to hail another as a
champion of liberty and a defender of democracy. Such nonsensical conclusions
cannot be further from the truth as in the latest clashes between Palestinian
police under the command of the deposed Hamas government and militants from the
Helis family, concentrated mostly in Gaza City.
The Hamas-Helis clash of early August was immediately probed
by news media and Palestinian officials themselves as an extension of ongoing
Hamas-Fatah violence, which led in the summer of 2007 to a complete Hamas
takeover of the Gaza Strip. The logic was simple: the Helis clan is largely
loyal to Fatah, thus Hamas�s violent storming of their neighbourhood 2 August
was an attack on rival Fatah. Hamas, on the other hand, explained its crackdown
on Helis militants as part of its hunt for those responsible for the murder of
five of its members and a civilian in a massive blast that rocked Gaza beach 25
July.
Naturally, Hamas pointed the finger at militants affiliated
with Fatah in Gaza -- even though it refrained from directly accusing its rival
Fatah -- and at Israeli intelligence collaborators amongst Palestinians. Fatah
denied any responsibility in the bombing, which was clearly orchestrated to
destabilise the Gaza Strip. Gaza, despite the debilitating siege, has been
enjoying relative security as a result of Hamas�s firm control and a moderately
successful truce, agreed on by both Israel and Hamas, with the consent of all
Palestinian factions.
The truce with Israel, accompanied by hesitant but constant
calls made internationally to �engage� Hamas, positive remarks about dialogue
made by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, and recent efforts in Jordan to bring the
ostracised movement back to mainstream Arab politics, have all helped lay the
groundwork for an inescapable conclusion: that Hamas is not a fleeting phenomena,
and that isolation and repression have proved an ingredient of strength to the
Islamic movement in Gaza and elsewhere.
Just then, the Gaza blast went off. The nature of the beach
bombing is a clear indication that it was not a random act of revenge. The
high-profiled targets, the intensity of the blast, its precision and its timing
all suggest an elaborate operation aimed at a conclusive political consequence.
Some Arabic news reports, including Aljazeera.net, stated that the bombing was
a suicide attack. If true, then the employment of such a tactic -- which had
thus far targeted Israeli occupation soldiers, paramilitary settlers and
civilians -- would reflect the state of urgency and desperation of the
attackers. In other words, the bombing needed to achieve its political aim even
if it compels such an extreme upgrade in tactics. And if the goal was to
destabilise Gaza, further discredit the Hamas government, derail the
possibility of reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and invite security chaos
in the somewhat stable Strip, then the bombing was a considerable success.
Indeed, Hamas�s subsequent criminal investigation led it to
the Helis compound in Gaza. Demanding that the agreement between Hamas and Gaza�s
large clans be honoured, Hamas demanded the handing over of several Helis
militants accused of perpetrating and carrying out the beach attack. The
details of what followed remain blurry and narrated based on political
affiliations. Helis clan members and Fatah officials say that Hamas attacked
the compound with rockets and indiscriminate gunfire. Hamas contends that the
militants fired at its officers first, compelling a gun battle that led to the
death of 11 people, including on both sides, and the wounding of 90 more. To
capitalise on another handy opportunity, Israel promised to deliver
Fatah-Helles clan members, who fled Gaza to Israel, to the Palestinian
Authority in Ramallah, in the West Bank, as it later did. According to one
Israeli official, the move was part of Israel�s commitment to fight Islamic
extremism.
In reality, however, the beach bombing of 25 July was
designed to provoke a violent Hamas reaction, which was preceded and followed
by mass arrests of Hamas and Fatah members in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
and has ultimately aborted planned Egyptian mediation between the two main
Palestinian factions, thus weakening an already fractured Palestinian political
front.
More, the fact that Abbas had met with representatives of
the Helis clan in the West Bank, as if they represent a political organisation,
was a dangerous validation of clan militancy that has grown in Palestine after
the Oslo Accords of 1993 due to the security vacuum and decided corruption that
have afflicted the Palestinian police for years. Clan militants became a
necessary phenomenon to protect each family�s interests, and had replaced the
underground United National Front, which managed Palestinian affairs, despite
of the Israeli occupation, which has done its utmost to break down Palestinian
society and create an inherent sense of insecurity.
The bombing of 25 July, the violence of 2 August, and the
political repercussions they have generated have proved immensely harmful to
Palestinian national interests and spoiled the prospects of political
reconciliation, thus national unity, which in my opinion, was the very intent
of the violence in the first place.
Ramzy Baroud is an author and
editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many
newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The
Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People�s
Struggle (Pluto Press, London).