In Latin America, in the absence of a social revolution at
the moment of national independence, there were plenty of rebellions and
political revolts. Less frequently these were popular rebellions and almost
never were they ideological revolutions that shook the traditional structures,
as was the case with the North American Revolution, the French Revolution, and
the Cuban Revolution. Instead, internal struggles abounded, before and after
the birth of the new Republics.
A half century later, in 1866, the Ecuadorian Juan Montalvo
would make a dramatic diagnosis: "freedom and fatherland in Latin America
are the sheep's clothing with which the wolf disguises himself." When the
republics were not at war they enjoyed the peace of the oppressors. Even though
slavery had been abolished in the new republics, it existed de facto and
was almost as brutal as in the giant to the north. Class violence was also
racial violence: the indigenous continued to be marginalized and exploited.
"This has been the peace of the jail cell," conclued Montalvo. The
Indian, deformed by this physical and moral violence, would receive the most brutal
physical punishments but "when they give him the whip, trembling on the
ground, he gets up thanking his tormenter: May God reward you, sir." Meanwhile, the Puerto Rican Eligenio M. Hostos in 1870
would already lament that "there is still no South American Confederation."
On the contrary, he only saw disunion and new empires oppressing and
threatening: "An empire [Germany] can still move deliberately against
Mexico! Another empire [Great Britain/Brazil] can still wreck Paraguay with
impunity!"
But the monolithic admiration for central Europe, like that
of Sarmiento, also begins to fall apart at the end of the 19th century:
"Europe is no happier, and has nothing to throw in our face with regard to
calamities and misfortunes" (Montalvo). "The most civilized nations,"
Montalvo continues, those whose intelligence has reached the sky itself and
whose practices walk in step with morality, do not renounce war: their breasts
are always burning, their jealous hearts leap with the drive for
extermination." The Paraguay massacre results from muscular reasoning
within the continent, and another American empire of the period is no exception
to this way of seeing: "Brazil trades in human flesh, buying and selling
slaves, in order to bow to its adversary and provide its share of the
rationale." The old accusation of imperial Spain is now launched against
the other colonialist forces of the period. France and England -- and by
extension Germany and Russia -- are seen as hypocrites in their discourse:
"the one has armies for subjugating the world, and only in this way
believes in peace; the other extends itself over the seas, takes control of the
straits, dominates the most important fortresses on earth, and only in this way
believes in peace."
In 1883, he also points out the ethical contradictions of
the United States, "where the customs counteract the laws; where the
latter call the blacks to the Senate, and the former drive them out of the
restaurants." (Montalvo himself avoids passing through the United States
on his trip to Europe out of "fear of being treated like a Brazilian, and
that resentment might instill hatred in my breast," since "in the
most democratic country in the world it is necessary to be thoroughly blonde in
order to be a legitimate person.")
Nonetheless, even though practice always tends to contradict
ethical principles -- it is not by accident that the most basic moral laws are
always prohibitions -- the unstoppable wave of humanist utopia continued to be
imposed step by step, like the principal of union in equality, or the
"fusion of the races in one civilization." The same Ibero-American
history is understood in this universal process "to unite all the races in
labor, in liberty, in equality and in justice." When the union is
achieved, "then the continent will be called Colombia" (Hostos).
For Jos� Mart� as well, history was directed inevitably
toward union. In "La Am�rica" (1883) he foresaw a "new
accommodation of the national forces of the world, always in movement, and now
accelerated, the necessary and majestic grouping of all the members of the
American national family." From the utopia of the union of nations,
project of European humanism, it comes to be a Latin American commonplace: the
fusion of the races in a kind of perfect mestizaje. The empires of Europe and
the United States rejected for such a project, the New World would be "the
oven where all the races must be melted, where they are being melted"
(Hostos). In 1891, an optimistic Mart� writes in New York that in Cuba
"there is no race hatred because there are no races" even though this
was more of an aspiration than a reality. During the period advertisements were
still published in the daily newspapers selling slaves alongside horses and
other domesticated animals.
In any case, this relationship between oppressors and
oppressed cannot be reduced to Europeans and Amerindians. The indigenous people
of the Andes, for example, also had spent their days scratching at the earth in
search of gold to pay tribute to those sent by the Inca and numerous Mesoamerican
tribes had to suffer the oppression of an empire like the Aztec. During most of
the life of the Iberoamerican republics, the abuse of class, race and sex was
part of the organization of society. International logic is reproduced in the
domestic dynamic. To put it in the words of the Bolivian Alcides Arguedas in
1909, "when a boss has two or more pongos [unsalaried workers], he
keeps one and rents out the others, as if it were simply a matter of a horse or
a dog, with the small difference that the dog and the horse are lodged in a
wood hut or in a stable and both are fed; the pongo is left to sleep in
the doorway and to feed on scraps." Meanwhile the soldiers would take the
indians by the hair and beating them with their sabres carry them off to clean
the barracks or would steal their sheep in order to maintain an army troop as
it passed through. In the face of these realities, utopian humanists seemed
like frauds. Frantz Tamayo, in 1910, declared, "imagine for a moment the
Roman empire or the British empire having national altruism as its foundation
and as its ideal. [ . . . ] Altuism! Truth! Justice! Who practices these with
Bolivia? Speak of altruism in England, the country of wise conquest, and in the
United States, the country of the voracious monopolies!" According to
Angel Rama (1982), modernization was also exercised principally "through a
rigid hierarchical system." That is to say, it was a process similar to
that of the Conquest and the Independence. In order to legitimate the system,
"an aristocratic pattern was applied which has been the most vigorous
shaper of Latin American cultures throughout their history."
Was our history really any different from these calamities
during the military dictatorships at the end of the 20th century? Now, does
this mean that we are condemned by a past that repeats itself periodically as
if it were a novelty each time?
Let us respond with a different problem. The popular
psychoanalytic tradition of the 20th century made us believe that the
individual is always, in some way and in some degree, hostage to a past. Less
rooted in popular consciousness, the French existentialists reacted by
proposing that in reality we are condemned to be free. That is, in each moment
we have to choose, there is no other way. In my opinion, both dimensions are
possible in a human being: on the one hand we are conditioned by a past but not
determined by it. But if we pay paranoid tribute to that past believing that
all of our present and our future is owed to those traumas, we are reproducing
a cultural illness: "I am unhappy because my parents are to blame."
Or, "I can't be happy because my husband oppressed me." But where is
the sense of freedom and of responsibility? Why is it not better to say that
"I have not been happy or I have these problems because, above all, I
myself have not taken responsibility for my problems"? Thus arises the
idea of the passive victim and instead of fighting in a principled way against
evils like machismo one turns to the crutch in order to justify why this woman
or that other one has been unhappy. "Am I sick? The fault is with the
machismo of this society." Etc.
Perhaps it goes without saying that being human is neither
only biology nor only psychology: we are constructed by a history, the history
of humanity that creates us as subjects. The individual -- the nation --
can recognize the influence of context and of their history and at the same
time their own freedom as potential which, no matter how minimal and
conditioned it might be, is capable of radically changing the course of a life.
Which is to say, an individual, a nation that would reject outright any
representation of itself as a victim, as a potted plant or as a flag that waves
in the wind.
Jorge
Majfud is a Uruguayan
writer. He currently teaches Latin American literature
at the University of Georgia. He has traveled to
more than 40 countries, whose impressions have become part of his novels and
essays. His publications include Hacia
qu� patrias del silencio (memorias de un desaparecido) [novel] (Montevideo, Uruguay: Editorial Graffiti,
1996; Tenerife, Spain: Baile del Sol, 2001); Cr�tica
de la pasi�n pura [essays] (Montevideo: Editorial Graffiti,
1998; Fairfax, Virginia: HCR, 1999; Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Argenta,
2000); and La reina de Am�rica [novel] (Tenerife: Baile del Sol,
2002).