There is a very narrow and
rigidly defined framework within which discussion of U.S. policy towards Iran is
confined in political discourse and mainstream media. This framework
effectively precludes the possibility that there could be a change of foreign
policy which would produce more positive results than the present status quo,
policies which at best are counterproductive and at worst could have disastrous
consequences both for the U.S. and Iran, with repercussions that could extend
throughout the Middle East. An alternative framework is possible, but it
requires the dispensation of certain attitudes and myths and a reevaluation of
the facts concerning U.S. policy towards Iran.
An article from the July 21 issue of The Economist
provides a useful example for analysis in that it contains all the basic
elements of the existing framework. The gist of it is by now a familiar story;
Iran is ruled by unreasonable madmen intent upon constructing nuclear weapons
to use against Israel and the only option, as discomforting and undesirable as
it may be, is the use of military force to compel Iran to obey the rules set by
the West.[1] The present framework is conducive towards that end while
effectively precluding alternative courses of action.
Entitled "The riddle of Iran," the byline reads,
"Iran's leaders think a nuclear weapon could rejuvenate their tired
revolution. How can they be stopped?" No evidence is provided in the
article to support the implication that Iran's leaders are intent upon
acquiring a nuclear weapon or that they have voiced such a belief. This is
merely assumed, or even attributable to "Iran's leaders" themselves,
as though they had publicly declared their intention to acquire the bomb when
in fact Iran's government has repeatedly reiterated that its nuclear program is
intended only to produce energy.
The article opens with a quote from former Israeli Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu describing the Iranian government and then comments
that "If he is right the world is teetering on the edge of a terrifying
crisis." It's assumed his characterization of Iran as "basically a
messianic apocalyptic cult" could be accurate, though Netanyahu's precise
meaning is not expounded upon. This characterization of Iran's leaders as being
essentially a bunch of crazies sets the tone for the article, and is another
common element of framework. One corollary is that not only is Iran working on
the bomb, but they would actually be irrational enough to use it.
The article next cites "Israel and some American
experts" as predicting "that Iran may have a bomb by the end of
2009" and paraphrases Mohammed ElBaradei, director-general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as saying "that if Iran really
wants a bomb it could now build one within three to eight years." This is
told as though it were the most likely outcome with little to no indication that
only a worst-case scenario is being offered. A 2005 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) put Iran at 2015 before being able to manufacture a nuclear
weapon; it also regarded claims that Iran is working to do so as merely being credible
while noting the lack of specific evidencing to support the assertion.[2]
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
released a report shortly after which stated that Iran could produce enough
material to produce a single weapon by the end of the decade only if we assume
its leaders desired a weapon "as quickly as possible without regard for
international reaction" -- in other words, only if an unrestrained Iran
were to defiantly and recklessly push forward at the increased risk of their
program being detected).[3] Moreover, Mohammed ElBaradei has noted repeatedly
that there is no evidence Iran has diverted nuclear material for weapons. As
for the estimate given, this is apparently deduced from the fact that ElBaradei
said a couple years ago that Iran was five to 10 years from being able to make
a bomb.[4] Assuming his projection of Iran's progress were correct, we may
therefore attribute to ElBaradei the statement that Iran is now three to five
years away. The only trouble is that a more recent 2007 estimate from ElBaradei
still puts Iran "at least five to 10 years away" from being able to
develop a nuclear weapon -- in other words, they haven't progressed at all
towards that end since his previous worst-case estimate a few years ago.[5]
Another element of the framework is epitomized by The
Economist's description of "What Iran is doing at Natanz" --
enriching uranium in centrifuges -- as being "entirely illegal"
because its pronouncements that "its nuclear aims are peaceful" are
"disbelieved" and the United Nations has thus ordered the enrichment
to stop. A detailed analysis of the relevant UN and IAEA documents is
instructive as to deciding the accuracy of this statement.
UN resolutions 1747 and 1737 both basically reiterate 1696,
which begins by reaffirming the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
recalling the right of parties to that treaty "to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination." The NPT states that "Nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty," which state essentially that no party to the treaty shall
proliferate nuclear weapons. Resolution 1696 was enacted under Article 40 of
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulates that the
Security Council may "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable," but
"without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties
concerned."
Resolution 1696's provisional measures are to call upon Iran
to "take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its
resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence" about
Iran's intentions. In that document, the IAEA "Underlines that outstanding
questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for
confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran and in this
context deems it necessary for Iran to . . . re-establish full and sustained
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities including
research and development. . . ."[6]
This is a reference to Iran's previous suspension of
nuclear-related activities under the Paris Agreement. It is commonly implied
that Iran has a legal obligation to suspend nuclear activities under this
agreement, such as former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's statement that
"The Paris agreement . . . sets out very clearly that the suspension of
conversion and uranium enrichment processing continues until there is a long
term agreement under the Paris agreement."[7] In fact, the Paris Agreement
"recognize[s] that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building
measure and not a legal obligation."[8]
In short, the UN resolutions which are pointed to as
evidence that Iran's continuation of nuclear-related activities is
"illegal" are self-contradicting; acting under color of law they
demand that Iran continue its voluntary suspension and that Iran surrender its
right to continue with research and development while IAEA inspections are
ongoing, while at the same time reaffirming that it is Iran's "inalienable
right" under the NPT treaty to do so without prejudice. Therefore, the
Security Council itself is technically in violation of its own resolutions, as
well as the terms of the NPT Treaty and the UN Charter. Iran has not neglected
to point this out.
Returning to the framework, it typically includes, as a
corollary to all of the above, that there are only a very few possibilities. As
The Economist puts it, "In one, Iran ends up with nuclear weapons,
bringing new instability and a hair-trigger face-off with nuclear Israel into
one of the world's least safe neighbourhoods. In another, America or Israel
take pre-emptive military action and manage to stop it, even though such an
attack would almost certainly have very dangerous consequences of its own. In
the third ending, Iran is attacked, and enraged, and retaliates -- and still
ends up with a bomb anyway."
Of course, we can't do nothing. Therefore, our choice is
clear. The existing framework thus leads logically only to one conclusion: even
though it won't prevent Iran from developing a bomb we must bomb Iran despite
the predicted consequence that this would likely expedite this presumed
eventuality by pissing them off. In contrast to Iran's leaders, who are
irrational enough to attempt to acquire a bomb under international scrutiny and
the threat of violence and who would be just crazy enough to use the bomb and
thus bring utter destruction upon itself, leaders in the US and Israel are wise
enough to consider attacking Iran. Since this is the only logical course of
action, "they are not mad." Iran's use of violence would be insane
and evil while our use of violence would be rational and good (another truism
of the existing framework).
The article points out further ostensible
differences. Unlike Iraq, "there is no question of false intelligence: the
world's fears are based on capabilities that Iran itself boasts about
openly." So while the U.S. also accused Iraq of having weapons programs,
despite not having any credible evidence to support the claim, and invaded upon
that false pretense, the case of Iran is different because we know Iran
is trying to build a bomb -- and we may forget that we, of course, also said
the same thing in the case of Iraq and therefore pretend that this is a
difference, rather than a similarity, between the two cases.
So an attack on Iran is possible and logical despite being
"a huge gamble" because it would further deteriorate "relations
with the Muslim world" and because "Iran's leaders would almost
certainly hit back" by striking at Israel or American forces in the region
or by cutting off tanker traffic in the Gulf, "the world's oil
windpipe." Given the likely consequences, it might seem crazy to attack
Iran, but we must remember our leaders "are not mad."
This forces us to ask the question, "How could any
Western leader in his right mind risk initiating such a sequence of
events?" Simple. Although "attacking Iran would be bad, an Iran with
nuclear weapons would be worse." Once again, we see that, despite
potential horrible consequences -- including the likelihood that Iran
"still ends up with the bomb anyway" (and without even any
consideration for the human consequences, such as the death toll that would
result) -- since we can't very well just sit by and do nothing, bombing Iran is
a perfectly reasonable option, and one considered by "most of America's
presidential candidates." Actions which would otherwise easily fall under
the definition of insane are thusly justified, simply by accepting as axioms
that, one, any action is better than no action and, two, our only options are
to either take no action or to bomb Iran.
Of course, no discussion of Iran would be complete, in the
accepted framework, without mentioning that Iran's president, "the
Holocaust-questioning Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is widely reported to have
threatened to 'wipe Israel off the map'." The Economist here strays
from the conventional framework and actually acknowledges, albeit
disingenuously, that "in fact he may never have uttered those precise
words." There is some "ambiguity" about what he said, and he was
"vague about whether he means that Iran should destroy Israel or just that
he hopes for Israel's disappearance."
The standard context applied when Ahmadinejad is quoted as
having said those words is that Iran is intent upon building a nuclear bomb,
crazy enough to use it, and has openly vowed to "wipe Israel of the
map," is taken as a virtual call for genocide. This is a radical alteration
from the actual context from which the alleged quote was taken, which is
neither vague nor ambiguous, as the writers and editors for The Economist
must surely know, just as The New York Times defends its frequent use of
the phrase while acknowledging that Ahmadinejad never said "Israel,"
but "occupying regime of Jerusalem," and that he actually used a
metaphorical expression with an approximate meaning of "pages of time or
history" and not literally "map."[9]
The Middle East Media Research Institute translates him as
saying, "This regime that is occupying Qods [Jerusalem] must be eliminated
from the pages of history."[10] As to his intended meaning, the context of
his actual speech makes it clear. He was discussing oppressive regimes and the
need for the world to rid itself of them. He cited two other examples along
with the illegal Israeli occupation: Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Shah's Iran.
His message is perfectly unambiguous: oppressive regimes such as these have got
to go. There is nothing in the context of his speech to support the popular
claim that his intended meaning was to threaten violence against Israel. This
is, simply stated, a fabrication.
The possibility of an alternative to doing nothing or
bombing Iran isn't completely dismissed. Occasionally within the framework
there is room for questions such as, "Is there a way to avoid all of the
unhappy endings by finding a peaceful way to stop Iran going nuclear?" But
the answer to such questions is invariably, "no." After all, explains
The Economist, "The Europeans hoped they had stumbled on such a
solution last year, when they at least talked Russia and China into imposing
sanctions and George Bush into dangling the prospect of normal relations with
Iran once enrichment stopped." However, "the mild sanctions imposed
so far are not working" and "a third sanctions resolution, with
sharper teeth, needs to be enacted without delay."
The formula isn't dissimilar to that used before the
invasion of Iraq, when war was deemed not to be inevitable; all that had to occur
for a peaceful alternative to be realized was for Iraq to admit weapons
inspectors and surrender all its WMD for destruction. Iraq indeed admitted
weapons inspectors, but its failure to surrender WMD it didn't have in the
first place was judged to be a rational basis for committing a war of
aggression, defined at Nuremberg as "the supreme international
crime." Similarly, all that need occur for there to be an alternative to
bombing Iran is for Iran to acquiesce to demands from the U.S. and other Western
countries to renounce its rights under the NPT treaty to pursue research and
development of its nuclear program while monitoring and verification of its
application for peaceful purposes only is ongoing.
Iran, however, has made clear that it will not be bullied
and will not bow to threats of violence. Hence, when war becomes necessary, the
only remaining course of action, it will be Iran's decision. Via this
propaganda device, Iran will have to accept ultimate responsibility for having
made the decision to have the U.S. and/or Israel to bomb Iran; the bombers are
vindicated of all responsibility for their own actions and Iran bears total
blame.
The corollary should be obvious. If the existing framework
continues to dominate debate about Iran, there can only be one possible
outcome. It's acknowledged that this outcome will be undesirable and
counterproductive, but deemed necessary nonetheless because of the lack of
alternatives. Alternatives are, however, possible, if we are willing to
recognize certain truths, set aside certain assumptions, and dispense with
certain falsehoods and misconceptions contained within the accepted framework.
We could, for instance, begin with the alternative
assumptions that Iran's leaders are no more or less capable of rational thought
than Western leaders, that there should be a burden of proof upon those seeking
to justify a resort to violence, that violence and aggression by the U.S. would
be just as wrong as violence and aggression by Iran, that the U.S. and other
Western countries should, as they demand of Iran, meet their obligations under
existing treaties to which they are party, and that there are alternatives to
doing nothing or bombing Iran which would be in the best interests of everyone
involved.
Present U.S. policy towards Iran, as was the policy towards
Iraq, is designed to be self-fulfilling; the U.S. declares that Iran is a
threat because it intends to build and perhaps to use nuclear weapons, so it
then acts in ways predicted to increase the chances that this will occur. This
is a common theme of U.S. foreign policy, just as it was the judgment of the
intelligence community that Iraq would not likely use WMD against the U.S.
(assuming it had WMD) unless it was attacked. In that case, as here, the U.S.
acted not to mitigate the possibility of the very scenario used to justify
violence but rather to choose the course which would result in the highest
probability that the dreaded scenario will actually occur. The only logical
explanation is that the policies do not exist for the claimed purpose of
preventing violence but rather as a means to that very end.
The more threatened Iran feels by the U.S. and Israel, the
more likely it will be that Iran's leaders truly to begin to feel that they
require a nuclear deterrent to outside aggression. Iran is bordered by a
nuclear-armed neighbor, Pakistan, which is likewise bordered by a nuclear
India. Nuclear-armed U.S. and Israel have openly threatened violence against
Iran. The more the U.S. and other Western nations continue to teach Iran the
lesson that it's in their best interests to withdraw from the NPT treaty, the
more likely it will be that Iran does so. Neither Israel nor Pakistan is party
to the NPT treaty, yet the Bush administration lifted sanctions on Pakistan, offered
"aid," and made it an ostensible "ally" in the so-called
"war on terrorism." While threatening sanctions and even violence
against Iran for not being able to prove that its nuclear program is not
intended for military purposes, Israel, which has long had a nuclear arsenal
and which has long been in defiance of numerous Security Council resolutions,
is rewarded with significant financial and military support. The lesson is that
Iran is being punished for being a member of the NPT treaty, so the only natural
and logical course of action for Iran will be to withdraw from the treaty,
which would in turn mean the end of oversight and scrutiny of Iran's nuclear
program. This end result of present policies would then be used to ex post
facto justify the execution of those same policies to begin with, just as
occurred in the case of Iraq.
As with Iraq, the issue is not about weapons of mass
destruction or failed obligations under existing treaties, but about ensuring
U.S. credibility in its pursuit of global hegemony. There is one rule, which is
that the U.S. makes the rules, which the U.S. will enforce under threat of
violence. As was the case with Iraq, adherence to international law is not a
purpose the present policy towards Iran is intended to ensure, but rather an
obstacle to be overcome in its implementation. And as the invasion of Iraq has
proved, as predicted, to be catastrophic not only in terms of the human
consequences, but in strategic terms as well, so will any violence against Iran
have considerable and well recognized catastrophic consequences. The tragic
consequences of our present course of action are predictable. They are also
avoidable, but only if we discard the existing framework for discussion and
adopt a framework more conducive to reason and to achieving the stated policy
objective of ensuring peace and stability in the world.
References
[1] "The riddle of Iran," The Economist, July
21-27, 2007
[2] Dafna Linzer, "Iran
Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb," The Washington Post, August 2,
2005; A01
[3] Dr. John Chipman, "Iran's
Strategic Weapons Programmes," International Institute for Strategic
Studies (Press Statement), September 6, 2005; Sarah Buckley and Paul Rincon,
"Iran'
years from nuclear bomb'," BBC, January 12, 2006
[4] "No Evidence Iran Diverted
Nuclear Materials: IAEA," UN Radio, November 15, 2004; John Diamond,
"U.S.
intelligence agencies say Iran is years away from building nukes," USA
Today, April 13, 2006; "Iran
bomb is 10 years away, says ElBaradei," Agence France Presse, February
21, 2007
[5] Daniel Dombey, "FT
interview: Mohamed El Baradei," February 19, 2007
[6] UN
Resolution 1696, July 31, 2006; UN
Resolution 1737, December 23, 2006; UN
Resolution 1747, March 24, 2007; Charter of the United
Nations; Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
IAEA Res GOV/2006/13, "Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," February
4, 2006
[7] "Iran in new nuclear
arms pledge," BBC, May 25, 2005
[8] "Paris
Agreement" between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany
and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the
European Union
[9] Ehtan Bronner, "Just
How Far Did They Go, Those Words Against Israel?" The New York Times,
June 11, 2006
[10]
This
is the translation provided by The Middle East Media Research Institute