"Iraq is free of rape rooms and torture chambers."--President
Bush, remarks to Republican National Committee Presidential Gala, Oct. 8, 2003
"Abuse of prisoners was abhorrent and "does
not represent the America that I know."--President Bush referring to
American rape rooms and torture chambers in Abu Ghraib prison; interviews with
two Arab satellite news channels, al-Arabiya and al-Hurra; May 5, 2004.
In December 1990, The
Village Voice published a long detailed article on the American entrapment
of Iraq in Kuwait. The article described the coordination between the Kuwaiti
government with the CIA, James Baker, and the Bush family (Neil Bush had
interests in Bahraini oil deals, and oil exploration in the Persian Gulf) to
provoke Iraq into attacking Kuwait.
Background: Iraq charged Kuwait with stealing oil through
slanted drilling from the Rumailah oil fields situated in Iraq. As a
counter-charge, the Kuwaitis threatened that if Iraq attacks Kuwait, Kuwait
would, "Call in the Americans."
The American involvement in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute was a
masterpiece of double deception. As the United States was telling the Kuwaitis
to defy Iraq and not negotiate a solution, it was also assuring the Iraqis that
is was neutral on Arab-Arab disputes. Saddam Hussein himself confirmed the
American duplicity at the onset of the bombardment of Iraq with a famous
exclamation that no one reported in the Western media. Said Hussein: "Laghad
ghadara al-ghadiroon," translation: "the treacherous [meaning the
United States] betrayed us."
In part 37, I called those events and the political standoff
that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until the Gulf War as the first
stage of the American conquest of Iraq. Considering those events, that invasion
was a monumental American success in the strategy to (1) station American
forces in the oil-producing Persian Gulf region, and (2) wage war on Iraq to
eliminate a major Arab antagonist to Israel after the surrender of Egypt in
1978. (The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz described the role of Israel in the war
against Iraq by writing, "The Jewish lobbyists in the USA are deeply
involved in the propaganda work promoting a war against Iraq.") [Editorial,
January 13, 1990]
But the most ambitious item of that strategy was the
long-term planning to conquer the country (Iraq) with the second largest oil
reserves on earth. My statement of Iraq's conquest by stages is accurate. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, no other military power could hinder the
march of the United States toward an absolutist imperium through the control of
strategic regions and resources.
To restart colonialism, however, the United States proceeded
by escalation beginning with the threat of war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo
to test Russia's reaction. Once Russia assented by withholding support to
Yugoslavia and abstaining from employing deterrence, the United States attacked
Yugoslavia.
Because analytical history as used in this series is not
about chronology, but rather the ideologies, mass movements, political-economic
antagonism or collusions among states, and the motives that make that history,
I have to introduce the second stage of Iraq's conquest by reprising for a
moment my discussion on Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger. In their
article, "Keep Iraq above politics,"
Pickering (ambassador to the U.N. during the presidency of George H. Bush) and Schlesinger
(1973-74 secretary of defense to Nixon and Ford) stated, "But no matter
how much they differ [Referring to Bush and Kerry] over past decisions, they
must not lose sight of our critical national interests in postwar Iraq in
the years ahead."
In doing so, they (1) proposed to remove the Iraqi question
from any possible democratic debate during the election, (2) made of it an
exclusive affair of the imperialist circles, but not of the American people,
and (3) defined the timeframe for the re-engineering of Iraq to serve, among
other things, U.S. oil objectives and "national interests."
Beyond that, they employed the term "postwar" (as
in postwar Iraq) without referring to the conditions that created it, and the
conditions that war is leaving behind. Pickering and Schlesinger, naturally,
discarded everything else about the war on Iraq, but singled out the only thing
that matters to imperialism: a postwar reality that would allow the United
States to implement a "national Interests" project in the "years
ahead."
While the preceding statement is the co-primary catalyst
(the other Israel's agenda) for the U.S. war and the occupation of Iraq, other
U.S. imperialists take that motive, empty it from its content, and relate it to
a different subject. The following is a limited sampling of apparent motives:
We will stay on the offense. We'll
complete our work in Afghanistan and Iraq. An immediate withdrawal of our
troops in Iraq, or the broader Middle East, as some have called for, would only
embolden the terrorists and create a staging ground to launch more attacks
against America and free nations. So long as I'm the president, we will stay,
we will fight, and we will win the war on terror." [President Bush,
addressing National Guards and Reserves Idaho on August 24, 2005] [Source]
[Italics added].
Did Bush mean what he said? Yes, but only as it applies to the intent of continuing to occupy Iraq--the
rest is rhetorical rubbish.
However, Robert H. Reid of the imperialist news agency, the
Associated Press, privy to the scope of Pickering, Schlesinger, and Bush,
contradicted all of them by further separating the issue of unstated colonialism from the presence
of U.S. troops in Iraq. He recast the issue in a new dimension by inventing a
tale with which he hoped to create a different impression on the scope of the
U.S. presence in Iraq. He wrote:
After freeing the hostage and
capturing two militants, the Shiite militiamen were ambushed by the Sunnis on
their way out of the religiously mixed town, al-Husseini said. Police Lt. Thair
Mahmoud said 14 others--12 militiamen and two policemen--were wounded. The incident underscores tensions among
hard-line elements in Iraq's rival religious and ethnic communities at a time
when the United States is struggling to promote a political process seen as key
to calming the insurgency so that U.S. and other foreign troops can go home.
[Source]
Reid depicted the U.S. war and entrenchment in Iraq as if it
were a mission to promote a "Political
process seen as a key to calming the insurgency so that the U.S. and other
foreign troops can go home." The question is, based on what research can
Reid be so sure that promoting an Iraqi "political process" at the
service of the occupation regime has a calming
effect (read: tranquilizer) on the anti-occupation resistance? Reid was shrewd.
He separated the strategic decision to occupy Iraq from its imperialistic
reality, and then assigned an altruistic explanation to the continuing
occupation as exemplified by the phrase, "to promote a political process .
. ."
To amplify Reid's insinuation (published on October 27,
2005) that "U.S. troops would go after the so-called promotion of a
political process," the Associated Press reprised its campaign of
deception through the pen of another staff writer, Thomas Wagner, who repeated
Reid's words, almost verbatim. On October 29, 2005, Wagner writing from Baghdad
stated:
On Friday, the deadline for
candidates to file, a Sunni Arab coalition submitted its list of names,
signaling greater Sunni participation in a process Washington hopes will help speed the day when U.S. troops can go home.[
Source]
[Italics added]
Wagner added two new elements: (1) that the departure (going
home) of the occupying forces is what Washington hopes for, and (2) he
qualified the time for that "going home" as in, "one day." Reid and Wagner illustrate two things. First, the
amalgamation between the system and its means of communication, and second, a
flagrant element of deception: Wagner's statement, ". . . . U.S. can go home one day" is an
open-end supposition that, anyway, contradicts Reid's categorical, "So U.S.
and other foreign troops can go home."
Which version is correct?
The answer is neither. But we can deduce the true status of
intention by different means: the near completion of 14 permanent military
bases built across Iraq. This how it works: if 3,000-4,000 military personnel
would populate each base, the total would be between 42,000-56,000 individuals.
This number would probably be the size of what would remain from the original
colonialist expedition of the United Sates should it decide to "go home."
A size that is sufficient to embed U.S. presence in Iraq for decades to come.
Although U.S. politicians never talk about these military
bases, the strategy is clear: Iraqification of the American occupation force by
"Iraqi laws" written by the United States. . . . And with this
outdated stratagem, the U.S. is hoping to conquer Iraq.
While Bush kept moving inside his vacuous rhetoric,
Pickering and Schlesinger outlined a very specific agenda of U.S. imperialist
aims in Iraq. As for Reid and Wagner: both are insidious voices of trickery.
For instance, Reid was categorical that Sunnis attacked Shiites. How did he
know that? Since Sunnism is only an Islamic school of thought, do Sunnis then
wear insignias signaling they are Sunnis? Or did those Sunnis go to American
journalists and tell them: Yes, we are Sunnis and we attack Shiites!
To recapitulate, the conquest of Iraq followed an
experimented practice of colonialism: capitalize on circumstances to conquer by
stages. Within this design, the period from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
(August 2, 1990) until the eve of the American attack against Iraq (January 17,
1991) was only the beginning of a long road to conquest. The next period, which
began with the military operations against Iraq, otherwise called, "Operation
Desert Storm," is when the U.S. sealed Iraq's fate and prepared it for
invasion 12 years later.
The
Period, January 17, 1991-March 28, 1991
Nothing is more direct than the House Committee on Armed Services (then chaired by Les Aspen) in
communicating the strategic scope of the Gulf War. In its memorandum dated
March 30, 1992, and entitled: Defense For A New Era: Lessons of the Gulf War,
the Committee declares, a posteriori, the "marvelous" conditions that
allowed the United States to slaughter hundreds of thousands of Iraqis,
undisturbed:
Desert Storm was the perfect war with the perfect enemy. The enemy leader was
universally despised and his troops offered very little resistance. We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure and the perfect battlefield. We should be careful about the lessons we
draw from the war. [Source] [Italics added]
With this disposition to wage a war of
unprecedented destructiveness against a developing country, the United States
restarted its colonialist march against the people of Iraq who now replaced the
Original Peoples of the U.S., Hawaiians, Filipinos, and Alaskans, as a target
for conquest.
- On January 17, 1991, a military
coalition of 34 countries (90 percent of which were American forces thus
making the first U.S. war against Iraq an entirely American operation)
arrayed against Iraq, attacked it for a full 42 days around the clock with
massive aerial bombardment, followed by 100 hours of turkey shooting
called, "ground war."
- For a U.S. that was preparing for war
with the Soviet Unions since the end of WW2, Iraq was the perfect
opportunity and a substitute to test advanced weapons. These included Tomahawk
missiles (used for the first time in U.S. wars), firebombs, oxygen-sucking
bombs, napalm, stealth bombers (already experimentally used in the
invasion of Panama), active uranium shells (used in battle for the first
time).
- To test their theory on a war won
totally by air power, U.S. generals bombed Iraq to oblivion, not only
through advanced aviation but also by the Vietnam-style carpet-bombing of
southern Iraq with B52s. During that imperialist bombing, U.S. generals
called Iraq a "military-rich
environment." In
military jargon, this meant the following: 179,000 square miles of
territory was open for targeting at will.
- It is imperative to mention that the
American-imposed U.N. Resolution 678
which threatened war against Iraq unless it withdraws from Kuwait had been
written in a way to leave the United States free to make its own
interpretation of article number two of the resolution which reads, "The
U.N., "Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set
forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold
and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area;"
- Unequivocally, what Resolution 678
called for was "to use all
means to uphold Resolution 660," which called for Iraq to
withdraw its forces from Kuwait, but not for the destruction of Iraq. The
destruction of Iraq, however, was a fundamental U.S.-Israeli aim, since it
is the foundation stone of a geopolitical project to eliminate Iraq as a
strong balance to Israeli colonialism in the Middle East.
- It suffices to say that at the end of
U.S. military operations, the situation in bombarded Iraq was
catastrophic. The United States destroyed Iraq's electric grid system,
water and sewage purification stations, bridges, roads, basic industry
including motor vehicle assembly, tire manufacturing, poultry hatcheries,
fertilizers factories, dairy industry, chemical factories and every large
building or shed that could resemble a factory.
- In April of 1991, President George H. W.
Bush exhorted the Iraqis to "rise against the 'dictator'" and
hinted at support while his general in the regions promised logistical
support. But when the returning defeated Iraqi army and other civilians
responded to the exhortation by rising against the government, the United
States, in a very calculated move, made a turnaround, and proceeded to
defeat the uprising that Bush fomented.
- Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf executed that
move by allowing the Iraqi Army's gunship to suppress the rebellion, and
by blocking, capturing, and then delivering the advancing rebellious
battalions to the Iraqi government.
- The sole purpose of that strategy was
all too obvious: keeping a defeated regime in power to extract from it
maximum concessions. All other puerile American suggestions that the
United States did that to appease Saudi Arabia that an Arab Shiite not
gain power in Iraq, etc . . . are just a standard U.S. justificatory
propaganda that covered the aims of Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, et al.
- Years later in an interview with Peter
Jennings, Brent Scowcroft, admitted that the U.S. wanted a defeated regime
but not a revolution that would
turn Washington's objectives upside down and steals its military victory.
(Meaning: If the rebellion had succeeded, those who would be the new
leaders could have disregarded the terms of the ceasefire agreed to and
signed by Saddam Hussein's government.
- Another aspect of the Gulf War: since
that war was never about Kuwait, but for the execution of a long-term plan
to occupy Iraq and other oil-producing countries, the successive so-called
No-Fly Zones [NFZ] imposed on Iraqi civilian and military aircrafts
signaled another piece of the strategy to weaken Iraq further and invade
it in the future.
- It is elementary that the purpose of
the NFZ was not to defend the Iraqi population from "Saddam's wrath,"
as Washington claimed, but to annul Iraq's sovereign rights over its own
airspace. When a modern state loses such rights, it loses its
independence; and that was the strategic meaning of the NFZ. A Global
Policy Forum's article mildly dealt with the question of No-Fly Zones as
follows:
"In April 1991, claiming a false authority under
Security Council Resolution 688, the U.S., UK and France began to patrol the
skies over northern Iraq, excluding Iraqi aircraft from this zone. The same
powers started to enforce a second "no fly" zone in southern Iraq a
few months later. Announced as a means to protect Iraqi Kurds (in the north)
and Iraq's Shi'a population (in the south), the
no-fly has offered dubious humanitarian protection, while engaging Iraq's
government in ceaseless military pressure. France eventually withdrew from
the no-fly process. The U.S.-UK turned
no-fly into an even more aggressive operation after 1998, when "more
robust rules of engagement" have led to regular bombing of ground targets
and substantial civilian casualties." [Italics added] [Source]
- Resolutely, U.S. economic sanctions
instituted with U.N. Resolutions 661 and 687
and enforced by an American-Arab blockade and no-fly Zones have wreaked
havoc on an Iraq already in shambles, and demonstrated the intricacies of
the plan to destroy it first, as a means to conquer it 12 years later.
In the following
part, we shall discuss the active phase of the second stage of conquest, i.e.,
the Gulf War, its consequences, and the paradigms it created.
Next: Part 39:
Deep inside America's Lab of Horror
B. J. Sabri is an Iraqi-American anti-war activist.
Email: bjsabri@yahoo.com.