A wag once famously said that Samuel Beckett�s Waiting for Godot
was a play where nothing happened . . . twice. The two former co-chairmen
of the 9-11 commission report, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, have released a
new book, "Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9-11
Commission." This book goes Beckett one better �
it is the third act of veneer over substance, self-aggrandizement over serious
analysis, and clich� over perspicacity.
It is another calculated attempt by the former
commissioners to place themselves in the media spotlight, and to overcome the
humiliation of their widely criticized and mostly debunked report. It is a
vapid and substanceless attempt to claim moral high ground and present the
co-chairmen as heroes of honesty. It would be a farce, except that it has
no story line, save the aggrandizement of the authors. At least they are
consistent in doing nothing and proclaiming that to be a sign of their devotion
to the country and the government. Beckett once said that �habit is the
ballast that chains the dog to its vomit,� and by this measure the chain
restraining Kean and Hamilton is a short one indeed.
As you recall, Act One, �The Dirty Ten Digging on
9/11,� consisted of extraordinary performances by every single member of the
commission to convince us, the audience -- the gullible public -- of commission
independence, and its intent to provide our nation with the truth, nothing but
the whole truth; their pledge to hold the �culprits� accountable, no matter how
high or low on the ladder of the bureaucracy; their commitment to provide
�meaningful fixes and remedies,� regardless of any resistance they may have to
face.
During Act Two, the commissioners, led by their
stars, Kean and Hamilton, put on the performance of their lives. They
delivered a document that promised to be more than the mere sum of mortal
intelligence; they promised a report that drew on the nation�s soul and would
lay bare the necessity and nature of change.
Initially, this play, scripted by the very powers
the commission was to investigate, was to have only two acts. However,
due to gradually increasing critiques by some in the media, even some of those
who originally attended the serenade chorus, and fairly loud boos from some of
the previously cheering audience, the producers have now decided to add
additional act(s). Act Three, the Finger-Pointing and Blame Game, stars Kean
and Hamilton as two comrades holding hands during the act and directing blame
at the other eight commission members, who are now cast as traitors and
deceivers. The audience is led to assume that the other eight members
were responsible for the now untenable report; decided to pursue practical
failure but achieve popular success; traded the public welfare for personal
gain.
The Commission was created and put in place due to the relentless
pressure and outcry by the 9/11 family members and their public supporters who
had three objectives in mind: 1) Getting all the facts; 2) Establishing
Accountability for those who failed us due to their intentional or
unintentional acts; 3) Provide recommendation for real fixes and meaningful
remedies.
The Commission fulfilled none of those three objectives. In their
responsibility to report all the facts: They either refused to interview all
relevant experts and witnesses, or, they censored the reports provided to them
by those with direct and first-hand information. Both these acts were selective
and intentional.
Contrary to their pledge to establish accountability: They refused to
hold anyone accountable and lamely justified it by saying, �We don�t want to
point a finger at anyone.� All those responsible individuals remained in
their positions or were even promoted. And as far as meaningful remedies and
reforms are concerned, the commission threw in senseless, and in some cases,
detrimental cosmetic and bureaucratic �solutions� that ended up making our
government even more cumbersome and unable to respond to threats to national
security. In the name of solutions and reforms, they forced down our throats
exactly what led to the failure to protect our nation on 9/11: A highly
bureaucratic, complicated, inefficient mammoth of a malfunctioning machine.
On the Fifth anniversary of the September Eleven Terror
Attacks, we, the National Security Whistleblowers, want to go on record one
more time to reiterate the significant issues and cases that were duly reported
to the 9/11 commission by those of us from the Intelligence, Aviation, and Law
Enforcement communities, but ended up being censored and omitted. The
failure to address such serious and relevant issues, witnesses, and information
renders the report flawed and the commissioners parties to a fraud on the
nation.
The following Veteran National Security experts were turned away,
ignored, or censored by the 9/11 Commission, even though they had direct and
relevant information related to the Commission�s investigation (for the PDF
version Click
Here):
John M. Cole, Former Veteran Intelligence Operations Specialist; FBI - Mr. Cole worked
for 18 years in the FBI�s Counterintelligence Division as an
Intelligence Operations specialist, and was in charge of FBI�s foreign
intelligence investigations covering India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Cole
had knowledge of certain activities that directly related to the terror attacks
on September 11, 2001. He notified the 9/11 Commission during its
investigation, but never received a response. His name and contact information
was provided to the Commission as a key witness by other witnesses, but he was
never contacted or interviewed.
John Vincent, Retired Special Agent, Counterterrorism; FBI - Mr. Vincent worked for the FBI for 27 1/2 years before retiring in
2002. He worked his last 8 years in counterterrorism in the FBI�s Chicago
Field Office. Mr. Vincent, along with Robert Wright, exposed
inefficiencies within the FBI in working counterterrorism cases, and certain
warnings they had tried to pursue prior to the 9/11 attack that were directly
related to Al-Qaeda�s financial network and money laundering activities.
Although he was granted an interview, the commissioners� investigators
refused to let him provide them with information related to his case and the
9/11 terrorists network; they insisted on limiting the interview to
only administrative and irrelevant questions and issues.
Robert Wright, Veteran Special Agent, Counterterrorism; FBI - Mr. Wright is a
veteran special agent in the FBI Chicago Field Office Counterterrorism Unit. He
had been investigating a suspected terrorist cell for three years, when he was
informed in January 2001 that the case was being closed. Agent Wright, along with Mr. Vincent, exposed
inefficiencies within the FBI in working counterterrorism cases and certain
warnings they�d tried to pursue prior to the 9/11 attack that were directly
related to Al-Qaeda�s financial network and money laundering activities. Three
months before September 11, Wright wrote a stinging internal memo charging that
the FBI was not interested in thwarting a terrorist attack, but rather
"was merely gathering intelligence so they would know who to arrest when a
terrorist attack occurred." The FBI refused to allow Wright to testify
before the 9/11 Commission, however, the Commission did not insist or attempt
to subpoena Wright; despite the fact that it had subpoena power.
Sibel Edmonds, Former Language Specialist; FBI - Ms. Edmonds worked
for the FBI�s Washington Field Office as a language specialist with Top Secret
Clearance performing translations for counterterrorism and counterintelligence
operations dealing with Turkey, Iran, and Turkic speaking Central Asian
countries. She contacted the 9/11 Commission in May 2003 and requested a
meeting to provide them with information directly related to the terrorist
attack. The Commission investigators refused to meet with Edmonds and informed
her that due to their limited resources and time they were not going to
interview all witnesses. She was able to provide the commission with information
and documents only after certain 9/11 family members intervened directly. Ms.
Edmonds� testimony was completely censored by the Commission.
Behrooz Sarshar, Former Language Specialist; FBI -
Mr. Sarshar worked for the FBI�s Washington Field Office as a language
specialist with Top Secret Clearance performing Farsi translations for
counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations dealing with Iran and
Afghanistan. He had first-hand information of prior specific warning obtained
from a reliable informant in April 2001 on the terrorist attacks of September
11. Mr. Sarshar contacted the Commission directly but was refused. He was given
an interview with the Commission investigators only after 9/11 family members
intervened directly. Mr. Sarshar�s documented testimony was completely omitted
from the commission�s final report, despite his case being publicly confirmed
by Director Mueller�s Office.
Mike German, Special Agent, Counterterrorism; FBI - Mr.
German served sixteen years as an FBI Special
Agent and is one of the rare agents
credited with actually having prevented acts of terrorism before it became the
FBI's number one priority. He contacted the Commission in the
spring of 2004, but did not receive a response. In
2002 he reported gross mismanagement in a post 9/11-counterterrorism
investigation, which included serious violations of FBI policy and federal law.
Mr. German contacted the 9/11 Commission during its investigation and requested
that he be given an interview session in order to provide them with certain
domestic counterterrorism investigations that he�d pursued. According to Mr.
German there were links between certain domestic and international
counterterrorism related to the September 11 attacks. The 9/11 Commissioners
refused to acknowledge his request and never interviewed him.
Gilbert Graham, Retired Special Agent, Counterintelligence; FBI - Mr. Graham worked
for the FBI�s Washington Field Office Counterintelligence Division until 2002.
In February 2004 his name and contact information were provided to the
Commission as a key witness with information pertinent to the Commission�s
investigation. The 9/11 Commission refused to follow up and never contacted Mr.
Graham.
Coleen Rowley, Retired Division Counsel; FBI - In May 2002,
Coleen Rowley, as the Division Counsel at the FBI Minneapolis Office, blew the
whistle on the FBI�s failure to pursue Zacarias Moussaoui�s case prior to 9/11,
despite all attempts made by the Minneapolis division counterterrorism agents. She reported that FBI HQ personnel in Washington, D.C., had mishandled and
neglected to take action on information provided by her division. Despite her
high-profile case the commission chose not to interview Ms. Rowley. According
to Ms. Rowley, no one from the FBI Minneapolis Office (several Agents had
direct information) was ever asked to provide testimony, information, to the
9/11 Commission.
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, DIA - Colonel Shaffer
provided the Commission with detailed information on intelligence and pre warning
information obtained by his unit�s data mining project, Able Danger. The 9/11 commission staff received not one but two
briefings on Able Danger from Mr. Shaffer and his former team members, yet did
not pursue the case, did not follow up on this documented report and
refused to subpoena the relevant files. Mr. Shaffer�s testimony, together with
other witnesses who corroborated his testimony and information, were censored
by the 9/11 Commissioners and never made it to its final report.
Dick Stoltz, Retired Special Agent; ATF- Mr. Stoltz, a
veteran undercover agent with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, had
played an important role in Operation Diamondback between 1998 and 2001.
The sting operation involved a group of Middle Eastern men living in New Jersey
who were caught on tape in an ATF weapons sting conspiring to buy millions of
dollars of weapons including components for nuclear bombs. The case came to a
screeching halt with the arrest of only a handful of suspects in June of 2001
even though there was ample evidence that some of the people who were
attempting to buy these weapons had connections with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and
Osama Bin Laden himself. The 9/11 Commission refused to contact Agent Stoltz
despite all attempts made by several witnesses from the intelligence & Law
Enforcement Communities, and the 9/11 Family group, Jersey Moms.
Bogdan Dzakovic, Former Red Team Leader; FAA - Mr. Dzakovic had
worked for the Security Division of the Federal Aviation Administration since
1987 as a Special Agent, as a Team Leader in the Federal Air Marshals, and from
1995 until September 11, 2001 was a Team Leader of the Red Team (terrorist
team). Mr. Dzakovic had tried for several years prior to the 9-11 attacks to
improve aviation security in the face of the ever-increasing terrorist threat.
He provided the 9/11 Commission with his testimony and documented reports. His
testimony and report to the Commission was completely omitted from the final
report.
Linda Lewis, Retired Emergency Programs Specialist; USDA - Ms.
Lewis worked for 13 years evaluating and coordinating federal, state
and local preparedness for nuclear, radiological and chemical weapons
emergencies. Prior to September 11, 2001, she had reported numerous
inadequacies and dysfunctions in emergency preparedness, including a culture
of intimidation that discouraged federal evaluators from
reporting inadequacies in state and local plans and
preparedness. USDA officials had thwarted her efforts to
bring in terrorism experts to help the agency prepare for attacks on
federal buildings, including bio-weapons attacks such as the anthrax attacks of
2001. In vain, she had urged FEMA officials to develop a
national emergency communications plan and require interoperability of
federally funded emergency communications equipment. In the absence of
these preparations, New York City firefighters and police officers were
unable to communicate critical information on September 11 at the World Trade
Center. Ms. Lewis contacted the Commission and offered to provide
information regarding dysfunctional government preparedness, but
the Commission never responded.
Mark Burton, Senior Analyst; NSA � Mr. Burton served as an all-source threat analyst in NSA�s
Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) for most of his 16-year career.
He was the editor of IAD�s premier threat document; the 300+ page ISSO Global
Threat Summary, and was an adjunct faculty member at NSA�s National Cryptologic
School. He provided dozens of pages of relevant information to the
9/11 Commission, but was completely ignored and never asked to testify.
The above list does not include many others from the intelligence and
law enforcement communities who had similarly contacted or reported to the
commission but had been either turned away or censored, and of course many
others� who are still working within these agencies and are fearful of making
their identities known, due to the relentless pursuit of and retaliation
against whistleblowers by government agencies.
About National Security Whistleblowers Coalition
National Security Whistleblowers Coalition (NSWBC), founded
in August 2004, is an independent and nonpartisan alliance of whistleblowers
who have come forward to address our nation�s security weaknesses; to inform
authorities of security vulnerabilities in our intelligence agencies, at
nuclear power plants and weapon facilities, in airports, and at our nation�s
borders and ports; to uncover government waste, fraud, abuse, and in some cases
criminal conduct. The NSWBC is dedicated to aiding national security
whistleblowers through a variety of methods, including advocacy of governmental
and legal reform, educating the public concerning whistleblowing activity,
provision of comfort and fellowship to national security whistleblowers suffering
retaliation and other harms, and working with other public interest
organizations to affect goals defined in the NSWBC mission statement. For
more on NSWBC visit www.nswbc.org
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Copyright 2006, National Security Whistleblowers Coalition. Information
in this release may be freely distributed and published provided that all such
distributions make appropriate attribution to the National Security
Whistleblowers Coalition.