The
Israeli war on Lebanon has shaken the sectarian pillar of the U.S.-Israeli
regional plans, especially in the Iraqi launching pad of the U.S.-promoted �New
Middle East,� where major ethnic and sectarian minorities are being incited
against their historical peaceful co-existence with the cultural Pan-Arab and
Islamic heritage of the Arab majority as well as against each other.
The
reverberations in Iraq of the U.S.-backed Israeli war on Lebanon have been so
widespread and deep to shutter a three-year old political orientation of the
Iraqis towards doing away with their Pan-Arab identity and isolating their
country from its geopolitical Arab and Islamic incubator, in a massive
sectarian brainwashing that has pushed Iraqis to the brink of an all out civil
war.
Sectarian
as well as Pan-Arab solidarity took hundreds of thousands of Iraqis into the
streets �with yellow Hezbollah banners above their heads and U.S. and Israeli
flags beneath their feet.� [1]
The
solidarity mass protests forced the Iraqi pro-U.S. ruling elite to publicly
criticize the U.S.-backed war amid widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, led it to
accuse the Semite-to-the-bones Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of being an
�anti-Semite� during his recent visit to Washington, and mobilized U.S.-led
Iraqi forces to raid leaders of the anti-U.S. and Israeli protests in Baghdad.
The
U.S.-backed Israeli war on Lebanon has resonated into cracks in the Iraqi
political status quo:
First,
it shook the sectarian base of power of the ruling elites and questioned their
pro-U.S. affiliation. The hundreds of thousands who poured onto the streets of
the Shiite holy cities of Basra, Najaf, Karbala and Samarra, as well as
Baghdadm were Iraqi Shiite Muslims whose majority was misled by their leading
political hopefuls to distance themselves from the national resistance to the
U.S.-led invasion and occupation of their country.
Second,
it showed a divide within this sectarian base of power between an Arab-oriented
and an Iranian-influenced sectarian leaderships. The divide had, in fact,
bloodily surfaced in the early stages of the U.S.-British invasion in fierce
battles in the Shiite holy cities in southern Iraq. The political instinct for
survival led the rebellious Arab-oriented Shiite leadership to accept being
incorporated into the so-called �political process,� thus rendering its
anti-occupation slogans less credible, not to say hollow.
Third,
the war on Lebanon led to hard to conceal diverging views, at least in public,
between the U.S. occupying power and the Iraqi government, which the Americans
are doing their best to secure in Baghdad.
When
Al-Maliki addressed a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on July 26, he
condemned Israel's offensive, refused to condemn Hizbollah or to agree it was a
�terrorist� organization, although many members tried to embarrass him, leading
Democratic Party chairman Howard Dean to call him an �anti-Semite.�
Similarly
President Jalal Talabani and Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi made comments
critical of the �horrible massacres carried out by Israeli aggression.� [2[
Obviously
the three of them were accommodating the public anti-U.S. sentiment to retain
some political credibility, although there is no reason to doubt the
credibility of the sectarian credentials of al-Maliki and Abdul-Mahdi to
identify with a Shiite group like Hizbollah, in spite of the contradictory
political agendas and alliances.
Accordingly,
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice could not be fooled into a public
dispute with them, played down their public rhetoric, and confirmed that the
Iraqi prime minister and government remained assets �on the right side in the
war on terror.� [3]
Before
al-Maliki�s speech Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari, a Kurd, told U.S.
lawmakers that Iraq had joined some other Arab League nations in criticizing
Hizbollah's attacks on Israel.
Fourth,
the Iraqi mass protests have the potential to ignite a mass political movement
against the US occupation, already bogged down in Iraq by the �armed
resistance.�
However
the �cracks� cannot be exaggerated and leaders on both sides of the divide
remain hostage to their sectarian loyalties, thus ruling out any imminent
outbreak with their alliances that could make a difference in the Iraqi
national resistance to the U.S.-led occupation.
The
�Shiite� Hizbollah identifies more with the reportedly �Sunni� Iraqi national
resistance and its Palestinian counterpart than with the reportedly �Shiite�
collaboration with the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
It was
noteworthy that since Israel launched its air, sea and ground offensive on his
country, the Hizbollah leader who has turned into a popular Pan-Arab icon,
Hasan Nassrullah, has lashed out at and ruled out any future �American�
government in Lebanon, indirectly slamming the pro-American government in Iraq.
Earlier he had publicly hailed the Iraqi resistance without directly
criticizing the collusion of his co-religious �brothers.�
The
Iraqi sectarian-led mass protests were politically hollow because they were not
reinforced by either anti-occupation political or concrete moves on the ground.
It was
ironic to listen to the thousands of protesters sincerely chanting
anti-American slogans and announcing their willingness �to go and fight in
Lebanon,� while the troops of the �American enemy� were a few meters away
guarding against the protests spelling out of control against them and their
Iraqi allies.
Those
slogans could have been more credible had just a few of the protesters dared to
demand their leaders to overcome their sectarian loyalties and join their Sunni
compatriots in resisting the foreign occupation.
Al-Sadr
has a role in-waiting
For
example the Sadrist movement, the main leading force behind the protests, could
have gained national credibility by at least quitting its five cabinet posts
and the 30 seats it holds in the Iraqi parliament, which prop up al-Maliki's
government, whose spokesmen are day and night hailing the Americans as the
liberators, allies and friends of the Iraqi people, thus prolonging the
occupation.
The
silent voice of the Sunni-led Iraqi national resistance was much louder in its
solidarity with the Shiite-led Lebanese resistance than the deafening shouts of
the protesters.
Disillusion
is on the rise.
�The
government formed after the fall of the [Saddam Hussein-led Baath] regime
hasn�t been able to do anything, just make many promises. And people are fed up
with the promises,� said Sheikh Bashir al Najafi, a senior Shiite leader. �One
day we will not be able to stop a popular revolution.� [4]
Similarly
Amman al Janafi, a 39-year-old dentist from Najaf, criticized Grand Ayatollah
Ali Sistani for urging Shiites to vote for the U.S.-engineered Iraqi
constitution and participate in the last elections. �The failure of the
Islamist political parties broke the trust between the Marjaiyyah [the Shiite
Leader�s Council] and the people. Even if Ayatollah Sistani himself were
nominated in the next elections, I would not vote for the slate.� [5]
The
Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr is very well positioned to play a historic role
should he overcome his sectarian loyalties and his personal anti-Baath
vengeance to give priority to the national resistance to foreign occupation. It
is a reason for raised eyebrows that he advocated �armed struggle� against
Saddam Hussein, but is opting for �peaceful� and �democratic� opposition to the
occupying power.
Only
such an option would reinforce real national unity, pave the way for real
national reconciliation, abort the U.S.-British sectarian plans to destroy
Iraq, shorten the plight of the Iraqi people and bring the overdue peace sooner
than later by withdrawing the so-called Shiite smokescreen for perpetuating the
foreign occupation.
Moreover,
it will unmask foreign exploitation of the Shiite tradition inside Iraq and
consequently relax the regional sectarian tension outside Iraq, a tension
fomented by various foreign provocateurs.
Such an
option is also a political survival outlet for al-Sadr, who is obviously
targeted not only by his sectarian rivals but, more importantly, by the
occupying powers.
In a
report leaked to the media recently, the outgoing British ambassador to Iraq,
William Patey, warned that �preventing [al-Sadr�s] Jaish al-Mahdi from developing
into a state within a state, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon, will be a
priority.�
Could
Sayed Moqtada free himself from a sectarian captivity to deliver and survive?
Only time will tell.
However,
the apparent contradiction between the words and deeds of the sectarian
anti-occupation rhetoric would in no time leave the sectarian leaders without
any popular base of power, given the growing disillusion, the continued
occupation of Iraq, a stateless government besieged in Baghdad�s Green Zone,
the ever-deteriorating security situation, a looming sectarian civil war, the
growing disillusion of the public with the U.S.-installed order of life, the
widespread abject poverty, the mushrooming corruption, the absence of basic
public services, the suspended national sovereignty, and the ever growing
national resistance.
The
salvation of Iraq and the Iraqis is national and Pan-Arab, because the Arabs
remain the vital heart of Islam, regardless of sect. Islam�s messenger and
prophet was Arab. Arabic was the language of Islam�s message. Arabs
disseminated Islam in the four directions of the globe and remain the
custodians of the message of peace. If skeptics doubt these facts of history,
they should at least consult the geopolitics.
Notes
(1) Los
Angeles Times on August 5, 2006.
(2)
Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi.
(3) Rice
on American television�s �Meet the Press� program.
(4)
Comments to journalists from McClatchy Newspapers on August 1.
(5) Los
Angeles Times on August 5, 2006.
Nicola
Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in Ramallah, West Bank. He is the
editor of the English Web site of the Palestine Media Centre (PMC).